



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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SM-1451-62

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Parker
Admiral Sharp
General Burchinal
General Hayes

Subject: Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the
Cuban Crisis (U)

1. Pursuant to your request during the Operations Deputies portion of the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1962, attached herewith as Enclosure A is a condensed version of the Chronological Summary of Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reference the Cuban Crisis, which you examined on 27 December 1962.

2. Subject chronology comprises the important decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to Cuba taken during the period 15 October - 28 November 1962, including summaries of pertinent intelligence data and implementation of decisions where considered appropriate and informative. It also contains as Appendices a list of high- and low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba, and brief resumes of Service activities during the crisis.


3. Not contained in subject chronology are the following:

a. Decisions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during executive sessions.

b. Decisions and actions of, or guidance given by, higher authority, except in a few instances where inclusion was considered necessary to explain JCS actions.

c. Routine decisions, or decisions of so minor significance as not to warrant inclusion.

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4. Also attached (Enclosure B) is a draft report of the operational aspects of the Cuban Crisis prepared by J-3 for submission to OSD for use by the Secretary of Defense in Congressional meetings. It was based on the attached condensed version of the Chronology and a Cuban Chronology prepared by the Department of the Navy.

5. It is requested that you review the attachments in order to discuss at an early meeting the terms of reference desired for the formulation of Congressional presentations for the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the Cuban Crisis. It is further requested that the attached documents be returned to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as soon as practicable.

[Handwritten signature]
R. C. FORBES
Colonel, USA
Deputy Secretary

Attachments

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6/24/88*

CHRONOLOGY OF JCS DECISIONS
CONCERNING THE CUBAN CRISIS (U)

~~This Document Contains
Restricted Data Atomic Energy Act of
1954~~

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
21 December 1962

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Series "A"

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Summary of Intelligence Indications and Surveillance
Relating to Cuba Prior to 15 October 1962

Three types of surveillance activity were conducted against Cuba prior to and during the crisis period.

1. Surveillance flights involving electronic platforms: average of 20-30 per month, increased to 95 in October.

2. Photographic missions: two flights per month beginning February 1962; increased rapidly following location of first offensive missile installation on 14 October; in October 25 high-level penetration, 76 low-level, 8 high-level peripheral missions.

3. Fleet Air Reconnaissance missions: daily basis; 30-60 per month; in October 93.

Beginning mid-July 1962 an unusual number of voyages of Soviet passenger and cargo ships to Cuba were observed, with evidence of military cargoes on cargo ships, including vehicles and construction and electronics gear.

On 5 August a high-altitude reconnaissance flight failed to reveal any significant military build-up.

On 18 August DIA reported indications that Soviets were possibly equipping Cuba with ECM equipment.

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This was based on reports of refugees, who also reported presence of Soviet or Bloc personnel in this connection.

On 31 August preliminary interpretation of high-altitude photography of 29 August revealed the first significant developments in Cuban military posture, seven SA-2 sites. Further analysis in following days revealed an additional site, a possible MIG-21 and 5 aircraft crates, and a possible SSM missile site. Further analysis confirmed, on 27 September, that last was a coastal-defense, cruise-missile site.

On 6 September the Daily Intelligence Summary gave a wrap-up report on recently delivered SA-2's and KOMARs. Also reported indications of heavy tanks, artillery, etc., all evaluated as defensive in character. Cuba was not considered to have an independent offensive capability.

On 8 September the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that photography of 5 September raised the confirmed total of SA-2 sites to twelve. It also reported the first proof of MIG-21s in Cuba.

On 20 September the Daily Intelligence Summary reported interception of SA-2 associated radar, indicating that at least one of the 12 SA-2 sites would soon be operational.

On 29 September the Daily Intelligence Summary contained an article summarizing the status of missile

sites in ... stated that: Banes SSM site seemed to be operational; Santa Cruz del Norte site seemed similar to that at Banes but no missiles reported there; large Florida site did not seem to have the deployed-site characteristics of either Banes or Santa Cruz del Norte; 14 SA-2s in various stages of development were now identified in Cuba; the only SAM assembly area reported so far was at Santiago de las Vegas, although there might be several more.

Two high-altitude reconnaissance missions were flown on 26 and 29 September. Several others planned were not accomplished owing to weather.

By 1 October analysis of refugee reports, combined with the pattern of SAM locations, had raised the possibility that MRBMs might be in the Pinar del Rio area.

On 1 October the Daily Intelligence Summary reported the location of the 15th SA-2 site, at Sigüanea, and commented that some SA-2 sites were believed operational.

On 2 October the Daily Intelligence Summary reported discovery of the 4th cruise-missile site, at Sigüanea.

On 4 October, in recognition of the developing Cuban situation and in order to focus the DIA effort on Cuba, the DIA established a special Cuban Situation Room with personnel and facilities for a 24-hour operation.

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On 6 October the Daily Intelligence Summary reported the arrival of two more Soviet passenger ships, bringing the total number of passenger ships voyages since July to 13 and total number of Bloc personnel believed carried to about 5000-6000.

On 8 October the Daily Intelligence Summary reported on 16th SA-2 site, at Manzanillo; it also reported that the Banes coastal-defense cruise-missile site was probably partially operational, with the sites at Santa Cruz del Norte and Siguaneya in the early stages of construction.

On 9 October the Daily Intelligence Summary reported the 17th and 18th SA-2 sites, at Manati and Senado, and commented that 25-30 sites probably would provide complete coverage of the island.

On 10 October DIA received a Navy Photographic Interpretation Center report of fleet aerial reconnaissance photography of 28 September pertaining to 10 crates carried on deck of the Soviet ship KASIMOV. On 10 October Director, DIA sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff which stated that these crates had been equated to the type used to carry IL-28 fuselages, and that this information was the first hard evidence indicating the probable delivery of IL-28 aircraft to Cuba.

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The two reconnaissance missions flown on 5 and 7 October, peripheral missions around the eastern end of the island, disclosed evidence bringing the total of SA-2 sites to 20. No new cruise-missile sites were identified. On or about 10 October the preceding information, together with a summary of the preceding Cuban missions during August and September, was briefed to the OASD/ISA and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On 11 October the Daily Intelligence Summary published identification of the 19th and 20th SA-2 sites, at Chambas and Esmeralda in Camaguey Province. Both were under construction.

On 12 October, pursuant to a policy decision that the Department of Defense would assume operational responsibility for reconnaissance flights over Cuba, the SAC was instructed to prepare for a U-2 overflight of Cuba, to be flown the first available date beginning 14 October 1962. SAC was instructed to penetrate and exit Cuba at specific coordinates which would entail photographic coverage of the previously mentioned Pinar del Rio search area, which DIA had selected as an area suspected of being associated with MRBMs. On 14 October the first SAC overflight of Cuba occurred. It consisted of a single pass across the western end of the island in accordance with the above instructions. This mission

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did not elicit any defensive reaction from Cuban air defenses. Immediately following the successful mission of 14 October, SAC was authorized to conduct several additional missions with a view toward obtaining complete photographic coverage of the island as quickly as possible. During the period from 14 - 20 October a total of 17 high-altitude reconnaissance missions were accomplished, which provided cloud-free coverage of 98 percent of the island.

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15 October

During the evening, the Deputy SecDef and the Chairman, JCS, were advised by DIA that preliminary interpretations of the preceding day's reconnaissance revealed six or seven cylindrical objects that "equated to 700-or 1100-nautical mile ballistic missiles" in the Pinar del Rio area west of Havana.

S

At an earlier meeting (1400-1710), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To ask CINCONAD for estimate of the air defense situation in the South East CONUS and recommendations on further steps. CINCONAD also to be requested to provide estimate of number of US casualties and damage which might result from Cuban air action against the US.

TS

2. No reservists to be recalled before Strike-Hour (C-119 personnel to be recalled immediately after Strike-Hour).

TS

3. Planning for operations against Cuba should assume some form of mobilization - initially not to exceed the 150,000 authorized by the current Congressional Joint Resolution. The impact on other plans, worldwide, should be considered.

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4. The maintenance of secrecy with respect to any projected operations against Cuba was fundamental to success, particularly between (1) the time of decision and (2) the time of initial air strike and implementation of the invasion plans.

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To request CINCLANT to revise OPLANS

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314 and 316 to provide for the

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16 October

Further analysis by DIA of aerial photographs taken on 14 October confirmed the presence of a MRBM site and disclosed two other military encampments nearby, one of which contained missile trailers. The CJCS and later the entire membership of the JCS were briefed concerning the missiles. Photographic evidence of an aircraft fuselage, probably an IL-28, and 21 aircraft crates was presented. The Daily Intelligence Summary noted, among other things, the presence of 25 MIGs and 10 IL-28s in the Cuban air order of battle.

S

At a meeting (1630-1845) the JCS considered twelve questions posed by the Secretary of Defense and replied as follows:

TS

1. Requirements for air attack on MRBMs?

TS

a. Unsound. Selective MRBM strike dangerous - not eliminate total missile threat, Cubans may attack US and Guantanamo, high combat losses, loss of surprise.

b. Should strike MRBMs, SAMs, airborne fighters, nuclear storage sites; defend Guantanamo.

c. Air Strike ready 24 hours after approval.

2. Requirements for air attack on MRBMs and MIGs?

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a. Unsound.

b. Must strike air bases, air defenses of those bases and SAMs.

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c. Air strike ready 24 hours after approval.

3. Requirements for air attack on MREMs, all combat aircraft, nuclear storage, and PT boats?

a. Unsound without naval blockade.

b. Must also strike tanks and all other significant military targets - those which can affect US or its forces. Objectives - eliminate threat to US and liberate Cuba.

mil plans
& ops

4. Requirements for (3) plus naval blockade?

a. Acceptable.

b. Naval blockade initiated immediately; 10 days to complete.

5. Requirements for (4)

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plans

Implementation - 17 October, the J-3 requested DC/S, LANTCOM, by telephone to have OPLAN 316 provide for a

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CINCLANT

reported to the JCS that the plan could be altered as desired by rescheduling the movements of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

6. Requirements for (4) plus 316-62? TS

a. Execute S+16 days.

7. Requirements for (4) plus 314-62? TS

a. Execute S+18.

8. How can air strike achieve maximum effect? TS

a. No low-level reconnaissance.

b. Pilots must be provided target

folders ASAP.

9. Should missiles be hit piecemeal when identified or wait until all or most are exposed? TS

a. As they appear.

10. What Soviet reaction may be anticipated? TS

Which general war preparatory plans necessary?

a. Soviet reaction unknown.

c. Disperse aircraft of SAC and NORAD

with nuclear weapons.

e. World-wide DEFCON 2 - after S-Hour.

f. Augment air defenses of SE-US.

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
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11. What air defense measures should be taken?

a. Augment orbiting patrols to 75 vs 24 now available.



12. What degree of mobilization will be necessary and when?

a. Up to 150,000

b. Consideration should be given to declaration of emergency.

The JCS also decided:

1. That the military danger of missiles in Cuba was sufficiently great to warrant attack even after the missiles were operational.

2. That CINCONAD was to be authorized to augment the air defense of southeastern U.S.

Implementation - On 17 October, JCS directed CINCONAD to take necessary action without delay and to advise the JCS of his plan, its effective date and what aid was required. CINCLANT advised JCS on 17 October that he had alerted shore based

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Navy and Marine fighter squadrons to be ready to
augment CONAD forces in the southeastern U.S.

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17 October

At a meeting from 0930 to 1620, the JCS agreed or decided:

1. Soviet reaction to US action in Cuba could be additional pressure on us (Berlin, Quemoy, Iran, Turkey, Korea) - most likely place Berlin.

TS

Implementation - The JSSC produced a study, which the Chairman, JCS, took to a meeting of the "Inner Council" at 1600. The conclusions of the study were: that the USSR would not resort to general war in direct response to US military action against Cuba, that the most likely Soviet reactions would be at sea, against Iran, or an ICBM "accident" on the Pacific Test Site (Johnston Island), and that sharp and strong encroaching actions at Berlin, short of direct seizure, could reasonably be expected.

TS

2. Each Service Chief personally to be responsible for specific aspects of planning.

TS

mid plans

- a. CSA - [REDACTED] operations.
- b. CNO - blockade and Guantanamo.
- c. CSAF - air defense of SE-US.

3. Requirement exists for propaganda efforts in Cuba.

TS

Implementation - SACSA assigned planning and monitoring responsibility.

1. Formally opposed attack on IREB sites only.

Implementation - In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, the JCS confirmed their views, presented orally the day before, advocating air attack against all missile sites, all combat aircraft and nuclear storage, combat ships, tanks, and other appropriate military targets in Cuba, in conjunction with a complete blockade; opposing a strike against IREMs alone; and advising that the elimination of the Castro regime would require an invasion, preferably under OPLAN 314.

18 October

Preliminary interpretation of 15 October high-altitude reconnaissance revealed: 1) two probable MR/IRBM fixed launch sites under construction; and 2) one MRBM field launch site confirmed and one evaluated as probable. The total launch sites identified to date were two confirmed and one probable MRBM sites and two MR/IRBM sites under construction; in 29 August photography, only the initial construction of one of the MR/IRBM sites had appeared.

In two meetings (0930-1150 and 1400-1740) the JCS agreed or decided:

.. If it was decided that only an air attack would be executed against missile sites, IL-28s should also be hit. TS

Implementation - CJCS to present this view to State and Defense Departments. TS

2. Exercise PHIBRIGLEX was to be delayed, and the troops were to be held aboard ships. TS

Implementation - Decision overtaken by cancellation of Exercise on 20 October.

3. It was desirable to obtain [REDACTED] TS

(ml) [REDACTED] for use by reserves of TAC.

Implementation - CINCLANT completed negotiation for use of [REDACTED] on 22 October; used as a staging and supply base. TS

4. CG CONARC and COMTAC to be CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT respectively. TS

5. Of five courses of action under consideration the JCS favored the one that with modification, TS

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called for:

- a. No political preliminaries.
- b. Air strike against missile capability, nuclear storage sites, MIG and IL-28 airfields, additional airfields, and significant military installations (other than for invasion).
- c. Evacuation of dependents.
- d. Defense of Guantanamo.
- e. Readiness for invasion.
- f. Blockade of Cuba.

[REDACTED] would be moved from the West Coast to Guantanamo by MATS, and the seaborne echelon of the [REDACTED] would move to the CINCLANT area.

Implementation

[REDACTED] airlifter from El Toro and arrived in Guantanamo on 21-22 October; after being reconstituted up to [REDACTED] departed by sea

on 27 October and arrived in area 12-13 November

7. a. Earliest feasible date for air attack TS was 21 October.
- b. Optimum date for air attack was 23 October
- c. Earliest feasible date for initiation of OPLAN 316 was 28 October.

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d. Optimum date for initiation of OPLAN 316 was 30 October.

Implementation - CJCS to present JCS view to White House and SecDef.

8. CINCLANT Command Organization was approved. TS

9. Movement of CONAD aircraft was authorized TS for defense of Florida area.

Implementation - On 18 October [REDACTED]

TS

[REDACTED] on

21 October, following JCS authorization, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Analysis of 17 October photography revealed two more MRBM field launch sites, of which there had been no evidence as late as 5 September. The total MRBM field launch sites now numbered four confirmed and one probable, with a total of 16 MRBM launchers and an expectation of 8 more launchers soon to be deployed. Sixteen 1100 n.m. missiles were considered operationally ready, capable of being launched 18 hours after decision to launch. Additionally, the two MR/IREM sites reported on 18 October were now evaluated as probable 2200 n.m. IREM complexes, with a total of 8 launch pads and an estimated date for operational readiness of December 1962. Other significant intelligence estimates on forces in Cuba as of 19 October were: 1) one possible and three confirmed coastal defense cruise-missile sites; 2) 22 SA-2 sites; 3) not less than 8,000-9,000 Bloc military specialists; and 4) at least 35 and probably 39 MIG-21s.

S

In two meetings (0900-1052 and 1400-1713) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. Navy assigned responsibility for blockade planning.

TS

Implementation - On 20 October Navy became engaged in preparation of position and policy papers, a scenario, and implementing instructions re limited blockade; position papers completed and provided to White House on same day.

TS

2. Only satisfactory solution to Cuban problem from the military point of view was:

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a. Notify Macmillan, and possibly Adenauer 2 hours in advance.

b. Surprise attack on comprehensive targets.

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- c. Reconnaissance surveillance.
- d. Complete blockade.
- e. Invasion - split (Army, Navy, Air force for invasion; CJCS for being prepared to invade.)
- f. US must realize strain would be placed on US alliances and problems would arise with respect to Berlin.

Implementation - JCS provided their individual and corporate views to the President at 1000 hours on 19 October.

3. Requirement existed for movement of one

TS

Implementation

S

4. SAC authorized to move aircraft from

TS

Implementation - On 19 October CINCSAC directed movement of nonalert aircraft from

TS

5. Desired initial mobilization was:

TS

a. Army - units needed to round-out STRAC units and possibly

b. Navy

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c. Air Force - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

d. Marine Corps - [REDACTED]

6. To approve a "Cuban Scenario," for White House use, which listed JCS actions taken and projected through 29 October. TS

7. To approve a warning order to CINCS regarding the critical situation. TS

Implementation - Warning order dispatched on 20 October.

8. To approve warning order to CINCS TRIKE regarding his Army and Air Force units passing to CINCLANT in event latter's OPLANS approved for implementation. TS

Implementation - In accordance with JCS directive, appropriate STRICOM Army and Air Force units put under OPCON of CINCLANT on 21 October. TS

9. PHIBRIGLEX-62 should be cancelled. TS

Implementation - After approval of SecDef PHIBRIGLEX cancelled on 20 October.

10. Air Defense posture of US should be verified. TS

Implementation - In response to JCS query, CINCONAD on 20 October represented overall US posture as "not appreciably affected" by CONAD TS

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deployments; posture in SE-US "adequate," except
for limitations of low-level radar and Key West
communications.

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20 October

The two probable 2200 n.m. IREB sites reported on 18 October were confirmed as the parts of one IREB launch complex: the operational readiness date of one site was now estimated to be 30 November; the other, between 15 and 30 December. In addition, the discovery of a "likely" nuclear weapons storage bunker at one of the sites constituted the first hard evidence that nuclear warheads would be deployed in Cuba. The total number of MRBM sites remained at five, four of which were confirmed; but it was now estimated that two of the confirmed sites had an emergency capability to launch some of their missiles eight hours after the decision to launch, and that the other two confirmed sites could be operational by 26 October. Finally, the count on SA-2 sites increased from the 22 reported on 19 October to 26, of which 16 were thought to be operational.

S

In a memorandum to the Chairman, JCS, Director, JS, and others DIA concluded that: 1) the magnitude of the Soviet missile force in Cuba indicated that the USSR intended to establish a "prime strategic base," rather than to make a "token show of strength"; and 2) the build-up was being carried out on an urgent basis, and appeared calculated to achieve quick operational readiness, leaving the completion of site construction until later.

At a meeting (1000-1406) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To approve a Talking Paper for use by CJCS at afternoon White House Meeting. (Substance - JCS for first attack on 23 October, striking all offensive weapons and supporting defenses, and against attack on offensive weapons on 21 October.)

TS

2. To approve a "Military Scenario for Use of Armed Force Against Cuba," which outlined the action already taken by the JCS and the actions requiring JCS approval, on a daily basis, between 20 October and 2 November; CJCS authorized to use scenario, in his discussions with President.

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3. To approve, as amended, a draft paper prepared by the Special Assistant to the President containing:

- a. Air Strike Scenario, 19 October.
- b. Possible White House Statement (22 October).
- c. Announcement Tuesday morning (23 October).
- d. Synopsis of President's speech, 23 October.

4. To approve a memorandum of Deputy SecDef regarding queries of 19 October reference:

- a. Latin American reaction.
- b. Detailed country situation.
- c. Nature of country internal problems.
- d. Country requirements.
- e. CINCARIB's capabilities.
- f. CINCARIB readiness.
- g. Latin American naval resources and availability.
- h. Offensive weapons which will apply in blockade.
- i. Implementation of air blockade.
- j. Alpha 66 units.

5. To approve Talking Paper for CJCS entitled "Blockade (Cuba) Action Contemplated," which

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outlined responsibilities of certain agencies and individuals with respect to blockade.

At a JCS meeting beginning at 1815, the JCS were informed of the decision on action in the Cuban situation: Plans were to be drawn up for sea blockade of Cuba while protecting US territory, shipping, and Guantanamo Naval Base. Blockade would begin 24 hours after President's TV speech (P-Hour) on evening 21 or 22 October. It was assumed OAS action would be obtained during P+24 hours. Plan would be prepared by State, DOD, JCS, Justice. CNO to represent JCS. Purpose was to stop importation of offensive weapons into Cuba.

TS

JCS were to be prepared to:

1. Execute air strike against missiles only:
 - a. Without warning on 22 or 23 October;
 - b. After 24 hours notice.
2. Execute CINCLANT OPLANS 312, 314, 316.
3. Pass to general war.

TS

At this, and a subsequent meeting (2030-2230) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. Certain tasks would be assigned, as follows:
 - a. Preparation of scenario to support blockade plan - Navy.
 - b. Preparation of new air strike plan against missiles - Air Force.
 - c. Preparation of detailed blockade plan - Navy.
 - d. Preparation of plan for defense of Guantanamo - Navy.
 - e. Preparation of air defense plan to protect US territory and shipping - Air Force and Navy.

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5. Preparation of views on U.S. missile bases in Italy and Turkey - Joint Staff (JCSA)

6. No low-level operations - Joint Staff (JCSA)

7. Dependents to be evacuated from Guantanamo 13 at speed - 6 hours.

Implementation - Evacuation of approximately 3,400 dependents, by ship and air, completed on schedule.

8. Reconnaissance aircraft - 12 October 1961

9. SAC aircraft to be moved from Florida 71 bases beginning 1200, 21 October

Implementation - Deployment of the [redacted] aircraft involved was completed 13 October

10. SAC alert aircraft to be moved from 73 vulnerable bases (Homestead) beginning 1200, 21 October

Implementation - All SAC aircraft cleared 73 Homestead on schedule; although [redacted] SAC aircraft relocated to bases outside of Florida, but B-52's remained on alert at Malm.

11. CINCs to be informed of contemplated 73 actions.

Implementation - CINCs informed 21 October.

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21 October

Evaluation of 18 October high-altitude photographs revealed one more possible IRBM site, and 19 October films showed one more confirmed MREM site. A total of two confirmed and one possible fixed IRBM sites, and six field IRBM sites containing four launchers each, had been identified. The total SA-2 sites remained at 26, but the number operationally ready had increased from 10 on the previous day to 20.

At 1300 hours meeting, JCS informed President would speak evening of 22 October. TS

At 1715 hours meeting JCS were informed speech would call for quarantine rather than blockade. TS

In three meetings (1000-1215, 1300-1510, and 1715-1848 hours) the JCS agreed on decided:

1. Limited reconnaissance (U-2) should be flown tomorrow (22 October). TS

2. Authorization should be obtained from SecDef for:

a. Disperse CONAD fighter aircraft prior to 8-hour. TS

Implementation - CONAD fighters and fighters dispersed to 13 October. TS

b. Disperse SAC 3 aircraft after noon of 22 October. TS

Implementation - SAC instructed on 22 October; by 24 October were dispersed. TS

3. One Marine Air Group to move from Cherry Point, North Carolina, to Key West NAS by MATS. TS

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Implementation - CINCLANT instructed on 21 October; MAG 14 arrived Key West 22 October and its ground support element was in place on 24 October

4. A need existed for the development of a detailed and complete civil affairs directive for a military occupation of Cuba.

Implementation - CSA directed to establish Civil Affairs Special Planning Group on 21 October; CSA submitted directive to JCS on 22 November.

6. CG, Third Army, to be notified of possible requirement for execution of Joint Defense Plans for SE-US and Florida Keys. Initiated by CG, Third Army, prior to P-Hour.

7. CINCLANT to prepare for protection of US shipping in Florida Straits, Windward Passage, and Yucatan Channel.

Implementation - CINCLANT instructed on 22 October; air and surface forces already assigned task on 21 October.

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8. Arrangements to be made discreetly to arrange with FAA for corridor reservations to Florida staging area as required by CINCLANT/CINCONAD. Further, MEZ to be established at P-Hour.

TS

Implementation - On 22 October Air Force and FAA representatives agreed to scope of MEZ, but MEZ never established; instead "Special Civil Air Regulation" issued by FAA on 24 October.

S

9. High-altitude photographic reconnaissance to continue.

TS

10. To approve a planning directive to CINCLANT for blockade of Cuba containing:

TS

- a. Rules of engagement.
- b. Instructions for blockade of surface ships.
- c. Instructions for blockade of aircraft. (JCS unwilling to launch air blockade unless there was predetermination to shoot down aircraft which ignored blockade.)
- d. Concept of operations.
- e. Defense of Guantanamo.
- f. Control and protection of American shipping.
- g. Coordination with Allied or friendly forces.

Implementation - With approval of SecDef, planning directive dispatched on 22 October;

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Blockade directed 23 October for Implementation
24 October; on 24, 25, 26, 27, and 31 October
issuing and modifying instructions dispatched;
although 22 October planning instruction encom-
passed aerial quarantine, the JCS advised CINCLANT
on 24 October that the quarantine as invoked would
not apply to aircraft.

11. To recommend the following actions:

- a. CINCSAC initiate force generation. TS
- b. CONAD execute phased dispersal of TS
nuclear-armed interceptors at 2 Hour -12.
- c. CINCSAC implement 1/3 airborne TS
alert.

12. That it would be desirable to decide TS
communications traffic between Russian diplomats in
Latin American countries and their counterparts in
other Latin American countries or to at least delay the
transmission of their messages. The purpose of this
action was to forestall or delay communist or USSR
activities in Latin America.

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22 October

On 22 October, there was no new information from photography, because poor weather had precluded photo-reconnaissance on 21 October. The operational readiness posture of missiles in Cuba as known on the morning of 22 October was therefore based essentially on photography through 19 October and was as follows:

1. San Cristobal MRBM Area.
Site No. 1: Full operational capability (FOC) as of 19 October.
Site No. 2: Emergency operational capability (EOC) as of 17 October; FOC as of 22 October.
Site No. 3: EOC on 20 October; FOC on 25 October.
Site No. 4: EOC on 23 October; FOC on 28 October.
2. Sagua La Grande MRBM Area.
Site No. 1: FOC on 22 October.
Site No. 2: FOC on 20 October.
3. Guanajay IRBM Area.
Site No. 1: EOC on 15 November; FOC on 1 December.
Site No. 2: EOC on 1 December; FOC on 15 December.
4. Remedios IRBM Area.
One site: EOC on 1 December; FOC on 15 December.
5. SA-2 Sites.
26 sites, 22 operationally ready.

There were "clear indications" available on 22 October that at least five Soviet missile regiments would become operational in Cuba, each regiment to have eight launchers and at least 16 missiles. This represented a first salvo potential of 40 missiles, with a refire capability of another 40. Finally, another possible nuclear weapons storage site was discovered, for a total of two identified to date.

In three meetings (0900-1157, 1330-1445, and 1620-1755) the JCS agreed or decided as follows:

1. CINCLANT to be authorized to reduce readiness to execute OPLAN 312 from six to twelve hours and thin out aircraft accordingly.

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Implementation - CINCLANT instructed on 21 October; on same day CINCLANT entered reclama against "thin out" still same day JCS made non- reliance of CINCLANT discretionary; on 24 October question reopened by higher authority.

2. Chairman, JCS, to inform SACEUR of developments

Implementation - SACEUR informed on 22 October

3. US Military Forces worldwide to go to DEFCON 3 at P-Hour, except for ETCOM.

Implementation - DEFCON 3 established worldwide effective 222300Z; USINCEUR authorized to use his discretion in complying with directive in light of warning order of 21 October.

4. CNO would take care of Latin American participation.

Implementation - CINCLANT prepared plans for combined US and Latin American quarantine; Latin American forces to take stations in Lesser Antilles and Caribbean approaches to Cuba under COMSOLANT; combined quarantine put into effect on 7 November. Latin American participation eventually involved:

a. Argentina - 2DDs and 3 SAR aircraft.

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6. Dominican Republic - 2 patrol frigates; naval and airport facilities.

7. Venezuela - 1 DDs

8. Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, Trinidad-Tobago, and Jamaica--various measures of cooperation, including naval and airport facilities and pledges of full support if needed.

9. To approve MINIMIZE worldwide. TS

Implementation - MINIMIZE directed on 22 October. C

10. To call up 21 C-119 squadrons and 5 interceptor squadrons. TS

Implementation - Disapproved by SecDef IS
on same day, but subsequently on 28 October 21 C-119, 3 C-123 troop carrier and 6 aerial port squadrons mobilized; call up totaled 14,214 men.

11. To hold up announcement of extension of enlistments until reserves called up. TS

Implementation - Reserves not called up, U
except for Air Force units indicated above, but tours of duty of Navy and Marine Corps personnel extended indefinitely on 23 October.

12. To authorize Services to move support units and fillers; this to be left to CSA. TS

Implementation - On 22 October CSA lifted restrictions from movement of "detachments, small units and fillers."

TS

9. Chairman, JCS to take up with SecDef the following:

TS

- a. Aircraft problem in Florida; JCS taking action.
- b. Air defense situation critical; CSAF checking.
- c. Security code word category to be eliminated unless SecDef feels it should be retained.
- d. Submarine incident and 23 Soviet ships on way over.
- e. Time of blockade; that CNO wants it at P+24 hours.
- f. Services will forward requests on reserve call-up.
- g. Move of 5th MEB (-).
- h. SAC generation.
- i. Declaration of DEFCON 3 worldwide.

10. USCINCEUR to be instructed to destroy or make inoperable JUPITERS if any attempt made to fire them without specific authorization of President.

TS

Implementation - USCINCEUR instructed on 22 October, and directed to inform US custodians and

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their commanders of instructions.

11. Latin American and NATO attaches and TS
NATO Military Committee (Standing Group) to be briefed
prior to President's speech.

12. Loading of combat command from 1st TS
Armored Division was OK.

Implementation - Task Force CHARLIE began TS
departing Fort Hood on 23 October, closed Fort
Stewart on 29 October.

13. CINCLANT to be requested to modify his TS
message (201716Z) concerning command set-up for
CINCLANT OPLAN 314.

Implementation - Change accomplished on 22
October; CG XVIII Airborne Corps would, subsequent
to initial assault, become CJTF Cuba vice CINC-
ARLANT.

14. JCS answer to President's question con- TS
cerning action in event Soviet build-up in Cuba
continues to be that blockade should be stepped up and
decision on general attack reviewed, either well in
advance of IREM operational date or Khrushchev's next
estimated political move against Berlin.

15. To send message to Chairman, US TS
Delegation IADB, requesting him and Lt. Gen. Burns
to use influence with IADB members in support of Presi-
dent's desire for OAS participation, including

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provision of naval forces.

16. SAC to initiate 1/8 airborne alert beginning 1200 local time, 22 October. To be done quietly and gradually, in full effect by afternoon 23 October.

TS

Implementation - SAC so instructed on 22 October; 1/8 airborne alert, involving 66 B-52s, was initiated within 1/2 hour of dispatch of JCS directive.

TS

17. SAC, at discretion, to implement dispersal plans for B-47 forces beginning 1200 hours, 22 October.

TS

Implementation - See para. 2b., 21 October.

18. CONAD to implement plan for dispersal of CONUS fighter interceptor force on quiet basis.

TS

Implementation - See para. 2a., 21 October.

19. If SecDef approved, SAC to generate its forces toward maximum readiness posture beginning 1200 hours, 22 October, to be at maximum by 1200 hours, 23 October.

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Implementation - See para. 6, 23 October.

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23 October

Low-altitude reconnaissance of Cuba was initiated.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported among other things that two of the six MRBM sites were operational, two were "proceeding to this status on an accelerated basis," and two would be operational within a week. Moreover, at three of these sites, the foundations of what appeared to be nuclear storage sites, similar to those already "possible" at two IREM sites, had been observed. There was still no evidence of currently operational nuclear storage facilities; but it had to be assumed that nuclear weapons could now be in Cuba. With respect to aircraft, IL-28s were arriving in Cuba, about 22 having been seen to date, and about 40 MIG-21s were present.

TS

In two meetings (0900-1210 and 1400-1742 hours) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To recommend, in event of a U-2 shoot-down, continuation of one-to-two U-2 flights daily plus low-level reconnaissance of critical areas until a U-2 loss occurred; then determine if predicted attrition rate acceptable. If so, continue flights; if not, attack all SA-2 sites as a minimum and resume U-2 flights.

TS

Implementation - Recommendation overtaken by guidance from higher authority; on 24 October CINCLANT instructed that, in event U-2 shot down, President to be informed through SAC/DOD channels; recommendation would probably be for immediate retaliation against most likely surface to air site, and probably U-2 flights would be continued.

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2. Regarding CINCONAD's requirement for 8 HAWK Battalions, Air Force to check with Air Staff and air defense experts. TS

Implementation - On 23 October CSA directed to provide 1 HAWK Battalion and CINCSTRIKE 1 NIKE-HERCULES Battalion to CINCONAD; HAWK Battalion in place on 2 November, and NIKE-HERCULES Battalion on 31 October. S

3. Inform CINCLANT, CINCONAD, and NASA immediately of White House authorization to execute six low-level reconnaissance flights at once. TS

4. To amend and approve message directing increased security at US domestic bases. TS

Implementation - On 23 October JCS informed appropriate CINCs that base security would be "stepped up," and that purpose was "to exclude press representation from areas where they are not welcome from your point of view." C

5. Recommend to SecDef on urgent basis that Presidential authority be obtained to load multi-stage nuclear weapons on US strike aircraft on QRA status under USCINCEUR's command. TS

Implementation - Memorandum forwarded on 23 October; Dep SecDef approved, 26 October; USCINCEUR notified, 27 October. TS-RD

Restricted Data Atomic Energy Act of 1954

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6. CINCSAC to be directed to initiate generation of SAC forces effective 241400Z; other CINCs to be instructed that A-Hour established only for SAC.

TS

Implementation - SAC so instructed on 23 October; on 24 October, SAC went on DEFCON 2 and moved toward maximum readiness.

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24 October

The operational readiness posture of missiles in Cuba was estimated as follows:

1. San Cristobal MRBM Area.
Site No. 1: Full Operational Capability (FOC) currently exists.
Site No. 2: Emergency Operational Capability (EOC) currently exists.
Site No. 3: EOC currently exists; FOC on 25 October.
Site No. 4: EOC currently exists; FOC on 28 October.
2. Sagua La Grande MRBM Area:
Site No. 1: EOC currently exists; FOC on 25 October.
Site No. 2: FOC currently exists.
3. Guanajay IRBM Area.
Site No. 1: EOC by 15 November; FOC by 1 December.
Site No. 2: EOC by 1 December; FOC by 15 December.
4. Remedios IRBM Area.
One Site: EOC by 1 December; FOC by 15 December.
5. SA-2 Sites
26 Sites, 24 of which were occupied; 23 operational.

TS

Continuing analysis of photography taken between 14 and 20 October had revealed a total count of 33 MREMs and 23 erector/launchers; the ultimate total was estimated to be 48 such missiles and 24 erector/launchers. The first low-altitude photography indicated, moreover, that camouflage was in use at several sites.

In two meetings (0900-1053 and 1400-1732) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. A memorandum on the subject of congestion at the Florida Air Bases would be prepared for presentation to SecDef.

Implementation - Memo prepared on 24 October stating that advantages of present deployments

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outweighed risks involved, but memo cancelled on same day; 50 per cent and 15 per cent reduction of OPLAN 312 forces in forward area subsequently considered by JCS and CINCLANT; but eventually no redeployments effected.

2. The Chief of Canadian Joint Services Mission should be more fully informed, particularly with respect to requirements for changing alert status as it affected defense of Canada and NORAD. TS

3. U-2 flights would be executed in overcast weather if there was a 50-50 chance of success. TS

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25 October

Three of the Soviet ships suspected as possible missile carriers enroute to Cuba were reportedly altering their courses. All of the Soviet dry cargo ships seemed to be pulling back from the quarantine line, but Soviet tankers were continuing toward Cuba. All of the 24 occupied SA-2 sites were now estimated to be operational.

In two meetings (0900-1238 and 1400-1655) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To approve, as amended, a draft memorandum to SecDef on "Timing Factors"; paper listed timing from receipt of implementation orders to initiation of action on or over Cuba:

- a. Low-level reconnaissance - 2 hours.
- b. Reprisal strike on one SA-2 site -

2 hours.

c. Air strike on all SA-2 sites - 2 hours (contingent on maintaining present posture).

d. Full air strike - 12 hours.

e. Implement 316 - Initial Assault,

Decision Day+7.

2. CSAF to answer offer of support from Argentine Air Force by responding that IADB will be kept informed.

3. In event of mobilization, CSA to move available AA units to Florida, and CINCONAD to be queried on effects of IL-28s on his plans, and on priorities he had indicated on 24 October.

Implementation - CINCONAD queried on 25


TS

October; CINCONAD responded on 26 October by requesting additional AA units, but JCS decided on 3 November that additional AA deployments to SE-US not necessary "at this time."

4. To approve the proposal of CSA to increase troop list for OPLAN 316.

TS

Implementation - On 26 October JCS informed CINCLANT that a revised Army Task Organization for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61 was approved; the revised Task Organization increased the combat power



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26 October

Latest information, derived basically from 25 October low-level photography, indicated that rapid construction, apparently directed toward achieving FOC as soon as possible, was continuing at each of four MRBM sites. Although no additional missiles or erectors had been seen, neither was there evidence of any intention to move or dismantle the sites. Camouflage and canvas covering of critical equipment was continuing.

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The three Soviet ships suspected as missile carriers were now steaming eastward toward the USSR, as were all save one of the Soviet dry cargo ships. That one continued to move toward Cuba; it would probably reach the quarantine line about 29 October.

There was considerable military activity throughout Cuba.

At two meetings (0900-1058, 1400-1700), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. That the Chairman, JCS would present to the Secretary of Defense and the White House the views of the JCS concerning a US suggestion that the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana discuss with, Castro alone, Cuba's predicament resulting from its Soviet ties.

TS

2. To approve a memorandum for the SecDef concerning a Brazilian proposal for a nuclear free zone in Latin America and Africa, in which they reaffirmed their orally expressed views that the US should neither propose nor accept any discussion of such a proposal. They recommended discussing only the immediate objective - prompt removal of the missiles.

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3. To revise the shipping requirements
for support of OPLAN 316-61.

TS

Implementation - In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, the JCS recommended that eight MSTS troop transports from the Atlantic and two from the Pacific be diverted and positioned at this time, and that 29 cargo vessels be chartered or requisitioned and berthed by D-7 so that they would arrive off Cuba on D+8 instead of D+11. Total requirements were 10 MSTS and 5 commercial troop transports, 107 commercial cargo ships, and 6 MSTS tankers. Two MSTS transports on the West Coast were subsequently diverted to routes from which they could be rapidly shifted to the Cuban operations if needed. Eight MSTS troop ships were held in East Coast ports. No authority to requisition commercial shipping was ever received.

TS

4. To assign responsibility for low-level reconnaissance to CINCLANT after clearance by Chairman, JCS, and the SecDef.

TS

5. Approved a memorandum, transmitted 29 October to SecDef, expressing the opinion that the current crisis had demonstrated again the

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shortage of sequential timers for low-level nuclear weapons. The shortage had reduced the flexibility, efficiency, and probable effectiveness of certain elements of SAC. The JCS recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission be urged to accelerate production of the item.

6. To direct CINCLANT to abandon further planning and preparations for OPLAN 314, instead to concentrate on OPLAN 316. TS

7. To recommend public announcement that the US was going to start around-the-clock reconnaissance. TS

8. To present to the SecDef an analysis of actions that might be taken against Cuba should the quarantine not result in the removal or withdrawal of offensive missiles. TS

Implementation - By a memorandum of 28 October for the SecDef, the JCS set forth for consideration a series of direct, indirect, and "provocative" actions. Given a wide range of choice, the JCS believed that the best course of action in the long run, and the only course that would surely eliminate the offensive weapons, was air attack followed by invasion. TS

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27 October

The previously reported rapid pace of construction at Cuban missile sites was confirmed by analysis of 25 and 26 October low-level reconnaissance. There continued to be no evidence of any intention to halt construction or dismantle or move the sites. Five of the six MRBM sites were now considered fully operational and the sixth would probably achieve this status on 28 October. At that time, the capability would exist to launch 24 1100 n.m. missiles within six to eight hours of a decision to launch, and to refire with 24 additional missiles within another four to six hours.

Photography of 25 October had confirmed the presence in Cuba of FROG tactical missiles, unguided rockets with a range of 20 to 25 n.m. A probable FROG launcher had been detected in a large camp and vehicle park, in company with 31 probable T-54 medium tanks and at least 31 other armored vehicles.

Possible nuclear warhead storage sites had been identified at five of the launch sites, as of 25 October.

Four long-range conventionally powered Soviet torpedo attack submarines had been observed near quarantine area in recent days.

Latin American reaction, to US moves continued favorable.

In a memorandum to the Chairman, JCS, DIA concluded that the Soviets had staged their buildup in Cuba probably because 1) they desired to improve their nuclear attack capabilities against the US, and 2) they estimated that the US could not prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power into the Western hemisphere.

At two meetings (0900-1245, 1330-1953), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. That, on further considering responsibility for reconnaissance missions, the JCS would assign missions through the Joint Reconnaissance Center, CINCLANT would conduct operational planning and exercise operational direction, and the DOD would obtain approval for missions.

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2. In response to an inquiry raised by
by higher authority on 22 October, to forward an out-
line operation plan for an air quarantine of Cuba to
the SecDef.

TS

Implementation - Plan submitted to SecDef
for approval on 29 October; copies forwarded to
CINCSAC, CINCLANT and CINCONAD for development
of supporting plans.

TS

3. In view of latest intelligence data, to
recommend that OPLAN 312 be executed no later than
29 October unless irrefutable evidence of the dis-
mantling of the offensive weapons in Cuba were obtained
in the meantime.

TS

Implementation - A memorandum including the
foregoing, coupled with a recommendation that an
invasion [REDACTED] follow the air strike [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] by seven days, was presented to the President
and the NSC Executive Committee on this day by the
Chairman, JCS. In an accompanying memorandum for
the SecDef, the Chairman recommended against
"taking the decision to execute now," but to main-
tain the existing condition of readiness to
execute OPLAN 312 (12-hour notice).

TS

4. In connection with above decision to
instruct CINCLANT and CINCPACFLT to hold up on dis-
persal.

TS

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5. To seek approval to drop six million leaflets over Cuba explaining the cause, purpose, and scope of the quarantine. TS

Implementation - Program for project submitted to SecDef on same day, but on 29 October project cancelled and on 7 November CINCLANT authorized to destroy leaflets. TS

6. To bring back from the Mediterranean for possible use in Cuban operations the amphibious command ship USS POCONO. TS

7. That, if the pattern of actions elsewhere in the NORAD/CONAD system indicated the existence of a Cuban and Sino-Soviet attack, nuclear weapons could be used to destroy hostile aircraft. TS

Implementation - By a message the next day, 28 October, the JCS advised CINCONAD to the above effect, emphasizing that CINCONAD's authority under his "Rules for Engagement" (NORAD Regulation 55-6) had not been changed by the Cuban contingency plans. This message, the JCS further advised, did not change the rules of engagement in the contingency plans, prescribing non-nuclear armaments. TS

8. In response to a SecDef request, to approve a memorandum setting forth order of magnitude of sortie requirements for four concepts of attack on TS

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offensive weapons in Cuba. Concepts were:

a. Limited attack against MREMs only.

b. Same as a, above, but assure all

MREMs inoperable.

c. Rendering inoperable all SAM sites.

d. The 312/62 concept of all-out attack

on all offensive weapons.

The JCS recommended rejection of all except the last, approval of which they recommended.

Implementation - Memo provided Chairman
for use as he saw fit.

TS

9. To send to CINCLANT "Timing Factors"
paper (see item 1 of 25 October) with information
that basic paper had been sent to President.

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23 October

As of this date, all 24 MRBM launchers in Cuba were estimated to be operational, capable of salvo of 24x1100-n.m. missiles within 6-8 hours of decision. At the three IRBM sites, moreover, construction continued at a rapid pace and some missile support equipment was being moved into vicinity of Guanajay sites, although no IRBMs had yet been observed. Camouflage, concealment, and dispersal measures were more extensive at the missile sites, and AAA positions were now evident at many MRBM sites. One US low-level reconnaissance mission of the 27th had been fired upon by these weapons.

Regarding IL-28s, there were now five partially assembled, one fuselage uncrated, and 21 aircraft crates at San Julian airfield.

At a meeting (0900-1104) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. In view of recent intelligence data on Soviet equipment in Cuba, to request recommendations from CINCLANT on any changes necessary, particularly whether US invasion and supporting forces should be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.

Implementation - Message dispatched the same day; CINCLANT replied that he considered it prudent that US air and ground forces earmarked for Cuban operations have an atomic delivery capability and that he intended to modify his plans accordingly.

2. Tentatively to schedule four low-level reconnaissance flights for late afternoon, one of which would cover eastern Cuba, and that they would fly through any fire encountered.

3. That Chairman should recommend that TS
announcement should be made that reconnaissance over
Cuba would continue until UN observers arrived and
that the US would strike any missile sites that
fired on US planes.

4. To draw to the attention of the CINCs TS
operational commanders the latest Khrushchev message,
which the JCS thought might be an insincere proposal
intended to gain time.

5. To inform CINCSTRIKE, COMMATS, and TS
COMMSTS, that forces planned for the reinforcement of
Europe, except one Marine Div/Wing team, were available
over and above the requirements of OPLANS 312, 314,
and 316, and further to direct them to maintain in
readiness their plans for reinforcing USEUCOM.

6. That in response to CINCLANT's request TS
for use of Key West International Airport as a staging
field for Army aircraft, it was not necessary at this
time to obtain the airport.

Implementation - On 31 October, the JCS TS
decided to authorize CINCLANT to commence
negotiations with local authorities for the use
of the airport. By a message on 3 November,
CINCLANT was given discretion to preposition

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logistical support and to make ready the operational facilities at the airfield, after he had completed the necessary arrangements with County officials, but that no aircraft were to be moved to the field.

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29 October

Continuing analysis of 27 October low-level reconnaissance indicated that construction and concealment activities were continuing at all missile sites, and that the status of the IL-28s remained basically as indicated on 28 October. Camouflage and other concealment measures were becoming more effective. At San Julian one IL-28 was in final stage of construction, four in varying stages of assembly, one fuselage uncanted, 21 shipping crates present.

On 29 October the Daily Intelligence Summary stated that:

1. Khrushchev's 28 October message to the President ordering dismantlement of Soviet bases in Cuba appeared to be an attempt to ward off any contemplated US action that might destroy the bases.

2. There was no proof that the Soviets had begun dismantling missile sites or IL-28s. The latest photography, taken prior to the Soviet statement, showed that construction was proceeding rapidly.

In a study distributed to the Chairman, JCS, Director, JS, and others, DIA concluded that: the Soviets attempted to establish an offensive base in Cuba which, if unhampered, would add substantially to their total nuclear capability against the US, and would, in their estimate, demonstrate that the US was no longer able to prevent the advance of Soviet power into the Western Hemisphere; further, that the Soviets miscalculated the rapidity with which the US became aware of this attempt, as well as underestimated the degree of world support for the US.

At two meetings (0900-1107, 1400-1737), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To conduct aerial reconnaissance of Cuba during this day, but without UN observers in aircraft, and that the UN should be so informed.

2. To forward to the Secretary of Defense an outline plan for the UN to use in connection with inspection for offensive weapons. The plan provided for

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aerial, ground, and port inspection by technically qualified UN personnel. The JCS recommended that the US fleet remain deployed as it was, that US reconnaissance flights be continued, and that the existing covert intelligence efforts continue.

3. That if the UN undertook photo-reconnaissance flights over Cuba in C-130's with Indonesian crews, the US should insist for reasons of safety, on having a US pilot aboard the aircraft, and also a US photographer, if possible. TS

4. That suspension of US air reconnaissance for two days (30-31 October) would be acceptable, but resumption on third day would be necessary. TS

5. To CINCONAD's rotation and reduction in dispersal of aircraft necessary to maintain combat-ready posture in view of maintenance needs of aircraft and weapons, short of complete cessation of dispersal. TS

6. That the Services should continue the current level of activity in exploiting training benefits of Cuban contingency force movements, without starting new projects. TS

7. That CG, CONARC (CINCARLANT) should be instructed to plan but not to implement a scheme for deploying the School Brigade from Ft. Benning to southern Florida as a Cuban contingency move. TS

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30 October

There was no evidence in 29 October low-level photography that the Soviets were dismantling or vacating any of the offensive missile sites. On the contrary, construction of the probable nuclear storage bunkers and concealment activities were continuing.

In a memorandum to the Chairman, JCS, DIA estimated that the Soviets could remove all offensive military equipment from Cuba in about two weeks, and that Soviet shipping then available in Cuba could lift all MRBMs and critical associated equipment, and most of the crated aircraft.

At two meetings (0900-1135, 1400-1700), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. That the Director, JS, should give special instructions to SACSA concerning a psychological program in Cuba castigating the Soviets and a world-wide psychological offensive insisting on immediate removal of all Soviet technicians from Cuba.

2. To recommend to the SecDef that "the following points should be included as conditions to negotiations on the removal of Soviet offensive capabilities from Cuba."

a. The elimination of all nuclear-capable delivery systems, including surface-to-surface missiles (including ship-based), bomber aircraft, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and missiles, warheads for any of these weapons, supporting and operating equipment, and missile fuel.

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b. The right of the US to conduct adequate aerial surveillance, without interference, during negotiations and as long as the US guarantees in any way the non-invasion of Cuba.

c. An immediate halt in construction of missile sites and bomber bases.

d. The quarantine "and other protective measures" to continue, and if necessary to be increased until the US is satisfied that any threat has been removed.

e. Members of any UN inspection team should come from neutral or non-aligned countries and not from the Communist bloc and any inspection must include ports and airfields as well as missile sites.

The Joint Chiefs were further of the opinion that the following should be excluded from discussion:

a. Base, aircraft landing, and water supply rights at Guantanamo Bay.

b. The "involvement of any other multi-lateral or bilateral alliance agreements and collective security arrangements."

c. The withdrawal of US forces or the reduction of the build-up until the US has been assured of the elimination of Cuba's offensive weapon capability.

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d. Any restrictions on the rights of Cubans "wherever they may be" to determine for themselves the political future of their country.

3. To provide the Chairman with guidance for discussions with the Secretary of Defense and the NSC Executive Committee, as follows:

a. Conditions for raising quarantine should be effective inspection team support and clear evidence of outward shipping. Otherwise, the quarantine should be continued.

b. For verifying the removal of offensive weapons, a practical system of inspecting outbound shipping at the ports was necessary. If the volume of shipping indicated a Cuban build-up, the US, after verifying the indications by overflights, could then go to the UN.

c. Air reconnaissance should resume on 1 November and continue as needed until all offensive systems were removed. In the event UN pilots were used, US personnel should plan the flights and operate the photo equipment.

d. US policy towards Cuban refugees should be the same as towards other national groups, and no aid should be given to groups like the Alpha-66.

e. Guantanamo should not be a matter of discussion.

31 October

1. Available evidence still did not indicate Soviet preparations for dismantling or vacating the offensive missile sites. S

2. Although many of the missile erectors had been removed on 29 October from their hardstands, this was not believed to have had any effect on their full operational capability.

3. DIA informed Deputy SecDef that, after comparing the photographs taken on 27 and 29 October: S

a. There was no evidence that the Soviets were dismantling their offensive weapons in Cuba;

b. There was evidence of additional construction as well as of extensive concealment measures.

4. The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that: S

a. Four Soviet cargo ships and 5-6 tankers were continuing toward Cuba;

b. Five other dry-cargo ships were apparently continuing toward Soviet ports;

c. Fourteen Soviet dry-cargo vessels, one passenger ship, and three tankers were presently in Cuban ports.

At two meetings (0900-1145, 1400-1528), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. In connection with a draft message from the TS State Department giving guidance to US negotiators at the UN, that air reconnaissance, inbound cargo inspection, and ground inspections must be continued as long as US noninvasion guarantee stands and regardless of Security Council's acceptance of report of removal of offensive weapons; that a time limit on the inspection-verification phase should be included; that inspectors must be technically competent; that 50 to 60 observers seemed an insufficient number.

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Implementation - Director, Joint Staff,
telephoned above to Chairman, JCS, at White
House.

2. To recommend a maximum air reconnais-
sance on 1 November, and, in view of incomplete radar
coverage of U-2 that was shot down, an airborne radar
watch, tracking by Guantanamo radar, and a fighter
CAP accompanying low-level flights.

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3. To recommend that the quarantine be
reimposed in full force on 1 November.

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Less effective, according to the JCS, would be delayed impact measures such as increasing US defenses in Europe and the Mediterranean and closing the Panama Canal to Bloc shipping..

Implementation - By a memorandum of

TS

6 November the JCS advised the Secretary of Defense to the above effect and pointed out that NATO strategy was based on the principle that any Soviet Bloc attack on a NATO country would call for immediate military retaliation by the NATO. The JCS, therefore, considered a Soviet attack on the [REDACTED]

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1 November

The DIA disseminated or forwarded the following:

1. A memorandum to the CJCS, in response to a request of 30 October, which included indicators of a future recurrence of Soviet military activity in Cuba and the number of dry cargo ships, 17 in all, required to carry away the known critical, specialized components of the offensive missile systems in Cuba, as well as the IL-28s, the MIG-21s, and the KOMARs;

2. A Daily Intelligence Summary which reported that six Soviet submarines had been photographed in the western Atlantic since 22 October.

At two meetings (0900-1010, 1400-1609), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To approve CINCLANT's recommendation in a message of 31 October that public release be made of information that a significant number of Soviet submarines had been positively identified off the US East Coast.

2. In approving a draft memorandum to the President on buildup and deployment in Phase II of a Berlin contingency, include language to the effect that

Implementation - Memorandum sent to SecDef on 2 November.

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2 November

The DIA reported as follows on information derived from low-level photography on 1 November:

1. It was concluded that the Soviets were abandoning the known MRBM and IRBM sites. The missiles, basic launching equipment, and camouflage had been removed. In addition, the launch sites had been partially destroyed, apparently by bulldozers.

2. The present location of the removed equipment was unknown.

3. Construction on the probable nuclear bunkers had apparently ceased.

4. Assembly of the IL-28s at San Julian airfield was continuing.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. All known MRBM sites in Cuba were now being or had been dismantled according to photography of 1 November. Launch pads had been destroyed and missiles and launch equipment removed. Their present location was not known and alternate deployment sites were possible, though unlikely.

2. Construction activity at IRBM sites had stopped and installations had been partially destroyed.

3. Five of the six probable nuclear war-head bunker sites showed no construction activity.

4. None of the Soviet dry cargo ships in Cuba was capable of carrying MRBMs or IRBMs below deck. The seven suspected missile carriers could return to Cuba by 16-25 November. Loading of missiles could take as much as a week longer.

5. IL-28 bombers were being worked on, as of 1 November. One was observed taxiing. Another appeared completely assembled; five were partially assembled; 21 were still in crates.

Director, DIA, on request of Director J-5, forwarded a memorandum on "Evaluation of Next Actions by USSR in Respect to the Cuban Situation." This study concluded that military actions related to Cuba would probably be viewed by the Soviets as too dangerous, while military actions not related to Cuba would probably depend on local issues.

At two meetings (0900-1055, 1400-1833), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To approve a draft memorandum to the President, assessing the effect of modern Soviet

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weapons in Cuba [REDACTED] The JCS concluded that since there were nuclear-capable delivery systems in Cuba the possibility of enemy use of nuclear weapons to repel invasion had to be accepted, although US could respond with overwhelming nuclear force against military targets. In more likely case that no nuclear weapons would be used, present plan of invasion was adequate and feasible, despite increase in Cuban conventional capability. Medical plans drawn up to accommodate 18,500 casualties in first ten days assuming nuclear weapons not used, although it was not expected that this figure would be reached.

2. To refer to OpsDepts for further consideration an "Outline Inspection and Surveillance Plan for Cuba," which had grown out of discussions on 31 October and 1 November of "Minimum Acceptable Actions in Support of Measures Necessary to Meet US Interests in Cuban-Soviet Negotiations." TS

Implementation - Later in the day, a memorandum embodying the outline plan was approved by the OpsDepts and presented to the Secretary of Defense as a negotiating objective for the US delegation at the UN. It contained the minimum requirements S

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for verifying the withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons in three phases. The plan called for US aerial reconnaissance in all Phases, UN aerial reconnaissance in at least the first two phases, UN systematic ground inspection in Phase II, UN periodic ground inspection during Phase III, UN/ICRC inspection parties at nine ports, three international airports and, as necessary, at sea, and UN spot checks of suspicious activities during Phase II and, if possible, Phase I. Participation of US personnel in the UN Inspection Organization was considered essential. In connection with the plan the JCS advised that the threat from Cuban-based offensive weapons could not be entirely eliminated until a friendly government controlled the island, for the weapons in question could easily be hidden.


3. That the deployment of additional air TS
defense artillery units to the southeastern US was not
necessary at this time, but that, if circumstances
changed, up to three HAWK battalions would be made
available to augment CINCONAD forces.

Implementation - A message to the above effect TS
was dispatched to CINCONAD on 3 November.

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4. To approve CINCLANT's request that authority be obtained to use Key West International Airport to stage Army aircraft during execution.



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3 November

The DIA reported the following information derived from low-level aerial photographs of 2 November:

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1. An increase in missile-related equipment had been noted for the first time at Mariel port. This was the first indication that the equipment was on its way to ports, of which Mariel is at least one.

2. The assembly of IL-28s at San Julian continued. Two aircraft were not flyable, five were in varying stages of assembly; and there were 19 shipping crates dispersed through the area.

At a meeting (0900-1025) the JCS decided or agreed:

1. In the light of a statement by the SecDef that the President desired San Julian to be covered by today's low-level reconnaissance, to approve the following low-level reconnaissance targets and priorities: 1) Havana and Camp Libertad, 2) Havana and Santiago de las Vegas, 3) San Julian, 4) Banes, 5) Mariel and roads in the vicinity, 6) Cienfuegos and roads, and 7) Remedios and Santa Clara.

TS

Implementation - The San Julian area was photographed on 3 November. The pictures, taken at low altitude, disclosed the presence on a nearby railroad siding of four IL-28 shipping crates apparently en route to the airfield.

TS

2. That the 5th MEB should continue through the Panama Canal into the Caribbean, without change of destination and mission.

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5 November

The DIA reported the following information derived from both high-altitude and low-level photography of 3 and 4 November:

1. Four canvas-covered missile transporters, 18 missile erectors, and 16 launch stands had been identified for the first time at the Mariel port. This information was derived from low-level photography of 4 November. On the deck on one of the freighters were four and possibly six IREM launch rings. S

2. Four IL-28 shipping crates were observed on 3 November low-level photography at a rail head near San Julian airfield. These were apparently en route to the airfield.

3. The 4 November photography revealed for the first time nine IL-28 shipping crates at Holguin airfield. S

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. Abandonment of MREM and IREM sites continued, according to preliminary analysis of 3 November photography and of part of 4 November photography. S

2. Thirty-two ocean-going ships were in port on 3 November. Missile-associated equipment was observed in the port area, but ballistic missiles had not been seen there and there was no evidence of any out-loading of the equipment.

3. Soviet deliveries of IL-28s now totaled at least 37 and possibly as many as 41. As of 3 November there were 33 IL-28s at San Julian: five being assembled, two more fuselages uncrated, and twenty more still in crates. Another four IL-28 crates were observed at a railhead north of San Julian. Two operational IL-28s previously observed were not at the airfield on 3 November. S

At two meetings (0900-1022, 1400-1610), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To comment on two proposals made during the McCloy-Kuznetsov discussions at New York the day before: that an arrangement for US vessels to come alongside Soviet ships to observe and count outbound missiles was not a sufficient check; and that a TS

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declaration of nuclear free zones seemed unacceptable.

2. To assign the Antilles Command, US Army TS
Caribbean, to CINCLANT's operational control for the
duration of the Cuban crisis, as CINCLANT had requested,
provided the Antilles Command continued to perform its
existing missions for CG, USARCARIB, until an actual
emergency arose.

3. To increase the Air Force force levels TS
authorized for OPLAN 312 and 316, as CINCLANT had re-
quested, generally to the actual level currently deploy-
ed and committed, with a clear proviso that the JCS
might direct reallocation to meet contingencies else-
where.

4. That, as proposed by the SecDef, no TS
word of the encounter between a reconnaissance aircraft
and MIGs during the morning should be given to the
press, that diplomatic protest should be made to the
Soviets, and that reconnaissance flights should continue
with a normal schedule the next day.

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6 November

On 6 November DIA reported the following information derived from 4 November high-altitude photography and 5 November low-level photography:

1. Twelve canvas-covered missile trailers and other missile-related equipment had been identified for the first time near the port of Casilda.
2. At Mariel port two freighters had been observed departing on 5 November with missile-associated equipment, to include five missile trailers and one erector. One other freighter was still in port with six missile trailers on its deck.
3. A fifth coastal-defense cruise-missile site had been identified at La Sierra.
4. Assembly of the IL-28s at San Julian continued.

On 6 November the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. Missile transporters and launching equipment were arriving at the ports of Mariel, La Isabella, and Casilda. About half the transporters and launchers previously observed at MREM sites and six IREM launch rings were now at these ports, and some equipment had been on-loaded. There was no evidence of unusual port security or of unique containers suggestive of nuclear warhead or nosecone handling.
2. Offensive missile sites continued to appear abandoned.

3. There was no evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads at the IL-28 airfields at San Julian and Holguin.

4. Assembly of IL-28s continued at San Julian as of 4 November photography. Nine IL-28 fuselage crates were seen at Holguin. The total number of IL-28s in Cuba was raised to 42.

On 6 November DIA prepared a cable to SAC in reply to a request of 5 November for an assessment of the future deployment of Soviet missile sites. The cable contained an estimate that such deployment was unlikely, providing air surveillance and ship inspections continued after removal of the present IREM/MREM systems.

At two meetings (0900-1014, 1400-1705), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. That, as a result of the recall of U-2 flights because of apparent firing preparations at

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Cuban SAM sites, three flights would be scheduled for 7 November so as not to expose more than one plane to hostile fire at any one time; and that in the future U-2 flights would abort only when actually fired upon, instead of on notice of significant change of activity in the Cuban air defense system, as called for by existing procedures.

Implementation - On 7 November, two U-2 S
flights were carried out.

2. To continue to hold MSTs troopships in TS
port on standby for OPLAN 316.

3. To invite CINCSRIKE, CINCSAC and TS
CINCONAD to the afternoon meeting of 7 November,
which CINCLANT and component commanders were scheduled
to attend, to discuss inter alia the possibility of
increasing the forces for OPLAN 316, the length of
time CINCLANT's forces could maintain their alert
posture without adversely affecting their combat cap-
ability, and the feasibility of a training exercise
for the forces assembled for OPLANs 312 and 316.

4. To approve CINCONAD's request for author- TS
ity to implement his OPLAN 1-62, including Rules of
Engagement and institution of MEZ-SCAT, upon implemen-
tation of any option of CINCLANT OPLAN 312, instead of
only on the full implementation of OPLAN 312.

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5. That procedures for checking outbound, TS
missile-bearing vessels should extend beyond alongside
observation and photography and should include boarding
vessels for close observation of missiles.

Implementation - Apparently above merely
constituted guidance for future discussions.

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7 November

DIA reported that the following information had been derived from low-level and high altitude photography of 6 November:

1. At Mariel port the photo coverage is incomplete. However, two missile transporters had been observed in a convoy moving toward Mariel. A freighter had been observed in the harbor with four, possibly five, missile transporters on its deck.

2. At Casilda port the freighter KURCHATOV had six missile transporters on its deck, and eight transporters were located in a nearby staging area.

3. At San Julian airfield five IL-28s were now flyable, four others in varying stages of assembly, and a total of 20 shipping crates were dispersed in the area.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. Photography of 4 and 5 November indicated a deployment of some MIG-21s from Santa Clara. On 4 November only sixteen of the previously noted 39 could be seen there, while twelve were at Camaguey. On 5 November four possible MIG-21s were seen at San Antonio de los Banos, the first noted in the western sector of Cuba. A general dispersal of MIG aircraft might be underway, since three MIG-15s had been seen at Holguin.

2. Three Soviet ships which had been loading missile-associated equipment at Mariel might have left. Another was still loading on 5 November.

3. A new cruise missile site had been identified from photography of 4 November, at La Sierra near the port of Cienfuegos. It appeared to be operational and contained the same essential elements as those found at the Banes site.

In a regular meeting (0900-1120) and in a meeting with CINCLANT, CINCONAD, CINCSTRIKE, CINCSAC, CINCARLANT, CINCAFLANT, and CG XVIII Airborne Corps (1400-1626), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. That the need to establish whether or not any offensive weapons were held back and concealed in Cuba justified recommending a higher level of reconnaissance effort; 8 November reconnaissance should

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comprise 5 U-2 flights and 14 aircraft for low-level reconnaissance, the latter to cover ports, Isle of Pines, and 7 caves identified as possible weapons storage sites.

Implementation - The reconnaissance approved TS
for 8 November was 5 U-2 and 10 low-level (unless Havana was to be included, in which case, 12);
2 U-2 and 12 low-level missions were actually flown.

2. Existing altitude limitation of 800-1200 TS
feet for low-level reconnaissance flights to be lifted to 1500 feet to increase span of coverage.

3. To send CINCLANT, as a directive from TS
from SecDef, the arrangements for partial inspection of in-coming and out-going shipments by rendezvous at sea agreed to between US and USSR spokesman in New York on 6 November, and to authorize direct liaison between CINCLANT and the Chairman, US Delegation, UN Military Staff Committee, and assign CINCLANT the responsibility for arranging rendezvous with Soviet vessels.

Implementation - CINCLANT so advised and
instructed on 7 November. On 8 November, CINCLANT was provided further guidance on subsequent Soviet agreements.

4. To approve a CINCLANT proposal that the TS
US establish shipping lanes to facilitate ICRC

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inspection of shipping, if such a system was established; CINCLANT was, however, to conduct such an operation in conjunction and consonance with the overall instructions for inspection (see paragraph 3, above).

5. Pursuant to a 6 November Presidential request for comments, to recommend to SecDef that US reaction to a hostile attack on US reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba be:

a. Protest to the USSR representatives at the UN; and either;

b. Full attack on all airfields and air defense weapons systems in Cuba, and consideration of additional measures, if hostile act judged to be part of deliberate program of resistance to US air surveillance, or

c. If the hostile act was judged to be an isolated incident, limited retaliatory action, preferably against the responsible enemy weapons site or airfield.

Implementation - A memorandum embodying the above recommendation was submitted to the SecDef on 7 November. On 10 November, with the further advice and concurrence of the JCS, ASD(ISA) submitted a substantially similar memorandum,

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representing the DOD position and cleared for the Department of State, to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

6. To assign CINCLANT, who was presently the task of preparing an outline plan that would affect existing OPLAN 116; CINCLANT was to include in his planning an early reinforcement of Guantanamo Bay by two BLTs of the 1st Marine Division and the commitment of 2nd Armored Division and 5th Infantry Division as follow-up forces in the invasion; CNO would determine time and port factors involved in putting into commission all LSTs of the Atlantic Reserve Fleet.

Implementation - CINCLANT submitted the requisite plan on 10 November; the plan contained an estimated cost of \$3,915,000 for putting Atlantic Reserve Fleet LSTs into commission, and an estimated time of from 18 to 25 days.

7. Agreed it desirable to have President and NSC Executive Committee tour selected CINCLANT installations to observe alarm forces and command posts before ultimate stand-down.

Implementation - The President and the Chairman, JCS visited SE-73 installations on 26 November.

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8. To authorize CINCLANT to add targets of his own choosing to target lists passed daily from Washington.

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8 November

DIA reported that the following information had been derived from 7 November high and low-level photography as well as US Navy sightings of ships en route to the USSR:

1. At Mariel port one missile transporter, 17 erectors, and 16 launch stands had been observed near the docks. Two missile transporters had been observed on the deck of one of the freighters, probably the VOLGOLES.

2. At Casilda the freighter KURCHATOV, which was in port on 6 November, was no longer present. In the port area, eight missile erectors had been observed, one being on the deck of a freighter. No missile transporters had been identified.

3. As of 8 November a total of 30 missile transporters and 22 missile erectors had been observed in the two port areas. This was in contrast to the 33 transporters and 24 erectors previously identified at the MRBM sites, and the 42 missiles claimed by the Soviets to be in Cuba. A total of 20 transporters and 1 erector had been observed on ships returning to the USSR.

4. At San Julian airfield four additional shipping crates had been identified, for a total of 24. Two more IL-28s were flyable, for a total of 7, and two others were in varying stages of assembly. A total of 33 aircraft could now be counted at San Julian, and together with the nine shipping crates at Holguin, a total of 42 had been observed in Cuba.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. FROG artillery rockets had been identified in 6 November photography at Artemisa military camp southwest of Havana. Five probable FROG transporters and two probable launchers had been seen, plus 28 eight-wheeled armored personnel carriers, 30 T-54 medium tanks, and nine SU-100 self-propelled assault guns. FROG had been sighted once before--a probable launcher at Remedios, on 25 October.

2. Artemisa camp apparently contained one of the four well-equipped Soviet armored battalions believed to be in Cuba. Another of these battalions was located near Santiago de las Vegas, south of Havana, where 39 T-54 tanks and other armored vehicles had been seen on 6 November.

3. Four assembled IL-28s and 1 IL-28 trainer (UIL-28) had been identified at San Julian. An estimated total of as many as 42 IL-28s were in Cuba, with the

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largest group at San Julian. Two obviously flyable IL-28s had been seen; two others were probably flyable, and five more were in various stages of assembly. Twenty fuselage crates had been still on the field on 6 November. The current location of four IL-28 crates observed at railhead on 3 November was not known. Nine other crates and many IL-28 sub-assembly boxes had recently been seen at Holguin.

4. An estimated total of 39 MIG-21s had been seen at three airfields in quantities suggesting that one squadron was based at each field. A few MIG-21s may have been dispersed to other airfields.

5. Four of the 12 Soviet ships in Cuban ports were believed to be loading missile equipment. Five others, previously loaded, were now at sea heading for Soviet ports.

At a meeting (0900-1052), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To have 5 U-2 flights daily henceforward, TS
despite possible "redundancy."

2. CINCLANT to be requested to submit out- TS
line plan of attack to destroy, with the "most precise means" available, the IL-28s at San Julian and Holguin airfields.

Implementation - CINCLANT responded on the TS
same day with plan.

3. As CINCSAC had requested, SAC authorized TS
to reduce its alert status effective 15 November while maintaining 1/8 airborne alert.

Implementation - CINCSAC so instructed on 8 TS
November; on 15 November, as scheduled, crew training schools were resumed for B-52, B-58, and C-135 crews, and one crew training sortie

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per month was scheduled for each cycle.
The 1/8 airborne alert remained in effect, the dispersal of sufficient "first and second cycle" B-47s to occupy all dispersal bases was continued.

4. Agreed that major objections to paper by ASD(ISA) entitled "The Removal of IL-28's from Cuba," dated 7 November were: TS

a. No need to reiterate assurances against invasion.

b. Any blockade should be strict, a total effort, possibly not affecting food and medicine,

c. After a limited period US should attack airfields to destroy all known IL-28s.

5. CINCPACFLT to be requested to provide requirements for total numbers of aircraft to: TS

a. Attack all SAMs;

b. Attack all IL-28s;

c. Attack all air defense systems.

Implementation - CINCPACFLT, on 9 November, provided the required information.

9 November

DIA reported that the following information had been derived from 8 November high- and low-level photography as well as US Navy sightings of ships en route to the USSR.

1. At Mariel port a total of 17 erectors had been observed, but no missile transporters have been seen.

2. At Casilda port eight transporters and seven erectors had been observed.

3. The total number of MRBMs observed to date at the ports was 31; the total erectors, 25. A total of 23 missiles and 1 erector had been observed on 5 ships en route to the USSR.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. Photography of 7 November indicated the continued assembly of IL-28s at San Julian. Seven planes now appeared assembled, while two others were in early stages of assembly. The 24 crates on the field presumably included the four sighted at the nearby railhead on 3 November. There was no evidence that the nine IL-28 crates at Holguin were being unpacked.

2. Eight of the nine ships designated by the Soviets to remove missile-associated equipment were believed to be under way this date.

3. Soviet troops associated with the SA-2 system and the cruise-missile sites in Cuba were estimated at about 4,400. Personnel associated with the former MRBM/IRBM sites were probably in the process of leaving Cuba; there were strong indications that some had already left.

4. Twenty-four SA-2 battalions, together with support personnel--an estimated 3,900--were located at the 24 SA-2 sites and the three SA-2 support sites.

5. As many as 500 Soviet troops might be involved in the operation and support of the four cruise-missile sites.

6. The Soviets were believed to have at least an additional 1,230 troops, formerly used for defense of the MRBM and IREM sites. These forces included a possible unit of SNAPPER antitank missiles with 130 men; a 100-man FROG battalion which normally consisted of six launchers and 24 missiles; and four highly mobile tank battalions, each with 31 T-54 tanks and 250 men. The tank battalions were located at Remedios, Artemisa, Holguin, and Santiago de las Vegas. The FROG battalion had been located at

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Artemisa on 6 November and the possible SNAPPER unit had been last seen near Remedios on 25 October.

7. Since the beginning of the dismantling of the known MRBM/IRBM sites, there had been a report of a ship departing Havana with decks crowded with Russians. There were no indications, however, of the departure of any Soviet troops associated with SA-2 or cruise-missile sites or those in ground defense roles. S

At two meetings (0900-1004 and 1400-1640) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To concur, with minor amendments, in an ASD(ISA) paper entitled "Long Term Surveillance Requirements," calling for: complete high-level coverage of Cuba every 30 days plus low-level flights or on-site inspections of suspicious locations; sufficient low-level flights to protect the "right" to such flights whether or not any suspicious activities were located; and continued shipping surveillance. TS

2. It would be preferable if IL-28's remained in Cuba, relieving US of obligation concerning guarantee of Cuba. TS

3. To query CONAD in the near future concerning long-range requirements for air defense of southeast US. TS

Implementation - CINCONAD was asked on 21 November for his recommendations on permanent augmentation of southeastern defenses, after the Cuban crisis ended. (CINCONAD expected to reply by 2 January 1962.)

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4. To approve a memorandum to SecDef expressing general agreement with a draft memorandum by ASD(ISA) for NSC Executive Committee, subject: Revised Course of Action in Contingency that a Surveillance Plane is Shot at or Destroyed. The JCS recommended, however, an amendment outlining reaction to an indication of general intention to resist US air surveillance.

Implementation - See item 5, 7 November.

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10 November

DIA prepared a special assessment of the capabilities of Cuban forces and Soviet military units in Cuba for CJCS. The estimate evaluated the formidable military capabilities of Cuban Forces resulting from the array of modern weaponry and accelerated readiness that had accompanied the build-up. The estimate also evaluated the Soviet combat forces in Cuba, pointing out that their continued presence posed a potent source of influence on the internal political scene and that their retention would indicate that Moscow had not fully abandoned the concept of developing Cuba as a potential Soviet strategic base.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. All nine ships designated by the Soviets to remove offensive missiles had now left Cuba. Missile-associated equipment had been identified on each of the ships. Canvas-covered missile transporters had been counted on eight ships which had left by 9 November.

2. Photography of 8 November had disclosed no change in the status of IL-28s at San Julian and Holguin.

DIA provided SecDef with information on the overall effect of the quarantine on world-wide shipping to Cuba, to the effect that: there had been no noticeable decline from the previous two months in the volume of shipping en route to or loading in Blue ports for Cuba; most Free World shipping was continuing to original Cuban destinations, though some slackening in this traffic might occur as a consequence of prohibitions of such trade by several Free World governments; recent increases in marine insurance rates might slow Cuban trade; there had been little reaction among seamen's unions; and there appeared to be some aggravating effect on existing Cuban economic problems.

At a meeting (C900-1214) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To continue seeking authorization for largest possible number of low-level reconnaissance flights.

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Implementation - There was, however, no increase in the number of low-level flights during the period ending 15 November, the usual number being ten.

2. After amendment to avoid implication IL-28's TS only offensive weapons US believes remain in Cuba, approved ASD(ISA) paper "Draft Presidential Statement Summarizing Situation Re Cuba," which reviewed partial fulfillment of Soviet pledges and called for completion of offensive weapon removal and of arrangements for UN verification; US quarantine suspension would be extended briefly to permit progress on above, but aerial surveillance to continue as needed.

3. Approved with amendment draft memo to TS SecDef, "Possible Way to Terminate the Cuban Incident." Addressing situation if IL-28's could not be removed by negotiation, memorandum recommended accepting IL-28's as Cuban, not Soviet, responsibility, thus disengaging Soviets and UN from issue and leaving to US and OAS; no noninvasion guarantee to be given and surveillance to continue.

Implementation - Memo reconsidered on 12 TS November; revision approved but subsequently cancelled when substance incorporated in Talking Paper approved on 16 November.

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3. Approved Itinerary for one-day visit by distinguished visitors from Washington to CINCLANT Headquarters, Ft. Stewart, Homestead AFB, Key West NAS, and other points, submitted by CINCLANT.

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12 November

On the previous day, 11 November, the Daily Intelligence Summary had reported that:

1. Photography of 10 November indicated that air-to-air missiles apparently were being readied for mounting on MIG-21 aircraft at Santa Clara. This was the first observation of these weapons in Cuba.

2. Photography of 9 November showed no additional IL-28s uncased at San Julian and none of the IL-28 crates opened at Holguin. At San Julian work apparently was continuing on engines of three of the IL-28s.

3. There were 29 MIG-21s and 13 MIG-15s/17s at Santa Clara.

4. All but one of the nine Soviet ships carrying offensive missile components out of Cuba had been inspected by US ships. Photography had confirmed a total of 42 missile transporters carried on eight of these ships. Canvas covers had been removed from at least some missile transporters on all ships inspected.

5. The military camp near Holguin, photographed on 9 November, contained nine canvas-covered SU-100 assault guns, four PT-76 tanks, and nine possible SNAPPER antitank missiles mounted on armored vehicles, in addition to 31 canvas-covered tanks. Six probable FROG rocket transporters had been seen at Remedios camp. Artemisa camp also was occupied. The numbers and types of equipment seen recently at these camps and at Santiago de las Vegas suggested that the four well-equipped Soviet units were composite armored or mechanized combat groupments of near regimental strength.

On 12 November, DIA reported that the following information had been derived from high- and low-level photography of 9, 10, and 11 November as well as US Navy sightings of ships en route to the USSR.

1. As of 11 November a total of 34 missiles and 26 erectors had been observed at the ports. A total of 42 missiles and 1 erector had been observed on eight ships en route to USSR.

2. Assembly of the IL-28s was continuing at San Julian airfield, but there was no evidence of assembling the IL-28s at Holguin Airfield.

3. Low-level photography over the four major military camps revealed detailed information on modern equipment to include T-54 tanks, FROG missiles, and SNAPPER antitank missiles.

4. Air-to-air missiles had been identified for the first time at Santa Clara Airfield. They were being installed on the MIG-21 aircraft.

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On the same day the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. All nine ships designated by the Soviets to onload offensive missile components had been inspected.

2. Photography of 10 November provided fairly conclusive evidence that assembly of IL-28s was continuing at San Julian. At least 11 of the 33 crates had now been unpacked. As of 9 November there was no evidence that any of the nine IL-28 crates at Holguin had been unpacked.

3. Recent photography indicated at least three FROG launchers and eleven transporters at military camps at Remedios and Artemisa.

At a meeting (1900-1145), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To revise the previously approved text of their memorandum on "Possible Way to Terminate the Cuban Incident" in such a way that the revised memorandum:

TS

a. Linked on-site inspection more specifically to the withdrawal of the IL-28s as subjects to be dealt with by the OAS and US rather than the USSR and US.

b. Added continuation of the quarantine, including POL, to the measures to be used by the OAS and US;

c. Concluded with a statement that a long-term solution could be obtained only through the implementation at the appropriate time of OPLANs 312 and 316.

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Implementation - The earlier memorandum was cancelled. Revised memorandum also subsequently cancelled. Substance incorporated in Talking Paper approved on 16 November.

2. To defer, pending the Chairman's debrief of higher level discussions of this topic, action on a J-5 report on "Suggested Policy Line for Cuban Crisis," a memorandum for the NSC Executive Committee that had been prepared by Under Secretary of State Ball.

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Implementation - Overtaken by consideration at higher level on 12 November.

3. That CINCLANT Plan GREY WOLF (fighter-accompanied search mission following the loss of low-level reconnaissance aircraft) required JCS consideration and authorization at the "Washington level" before implementation.

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13 November

DIA reported that the following information had been derived from high- and low-level photography on 12 November:

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1. At San Julian Airfield the assembly of IL-28s continued. Since the last photo coverage on 11 November, one additional fuselage had been uncrated, for a total of 13 uncrated aircraft. Twenty shipping crates were dispersed throughout the airfield area, for a total of 33 aircraft at the airfield.

2. At Holguin airfield there was still no evidence of the opening of any of the nine IL-28 shipping crates.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

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1. Photography of 11 November showed 38 MIG-21 fighters at Santa Clara. Apparently the MIG-21s earlier dispersed to other airfields had returned for installation of air-to-air missiles.

2. Accumulating evidence indicated that Soviet ground force units were present in greater strength than previously believed. These units had previously been equated to four reinforced medium tank battalions, a FROG artillery rocket battalion, and a SNAPPER antitank missile unit, with strengths varying from about 900 to 1,200 men. It now seemed that these four groupings contained a total of well over 4,000 troops. The presence of these units provided the Soviets with a potent source of influence on the internal Cuban scene. Retention of these units after withdrawal of the MRBMs would indicate Moscow had not abandoned the concept of developing Cuba as a strategic Soviet military base.

At two meetings (0900-1045 and 1400-1828), the JCS agreed and decided:

To concur in a memorandum from the CNO to the SecDef on "Quarantine Operations," which was in response to an ASD(ISA) request for a plan for quarantine more effective than the current "hail and pass" procedures.

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Implementation - In memorandum submitted that day to SecDef, CNO recommended authorization of visit and search on schedule progressing from Free World ship through Bloc shipping to Soviet vessels bound for Cuba be authorized; and that news releases be made, couched in language that indicated the quarantine was continuing, announcing that the SS TRAJAN had been boarded. Other boardings would be announced as they occurred.

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14 November

DIA reported the following information derived from high- and low-level photography on 13 November:

1. Assembly of IL-28s continued at San Julian Airfield. No additional shipping crates had been opened since 12 November.

2. There was no change in the status of the nine shipping crates at Holguin airfield.

3. A total of six canvas-covered possible erectors had been observed near the port of Casilda.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that photography of 12 November showed that eleven of the 29 MIG-21s at Santa Clara had been armed with air-to-air missiles. At San Antonio de los Baños eight MIG-21s had been seen, one of which was equipped with missile launchers. These eight had probably returned from Santa Clara where there were 38 MIG-21s on 11 November. At Holguin none of the IL-28s had been uncrated.

At two meetings (0900-1010 and 1430-1804), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. Accepted as additional guidance for the Director, J-5, who had been assigned the task of preparing a paper for the meeting with the President on 16 November, the following questions proposed by the Chairman: How important is the removal of the IL-28s? If these planes are removed, what is the military significance of the remaining Soviet personnel and weapons? If the IL-28s were not removed through negotiations, what actions were recommended? What military factors were to be considered in devising a formula for a noninvasion assurance? At what point should invasion preparations be ended?

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What would be satisfactory verification system
for future?

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15 November

The DIA reported, on the basis of high-altitude photography on 14 November, that there were no significant changes either at the ports or at Holguin and San Julian airfields.

The Daily Intelligence Summary indicated that photography of 13 November showed a general lack of activity. Holguin base remained operational. Photo coverage of and refugee reports on the Torrens military camp outside Havana indicated a well-established and active facility, which was believed to be a major Soviet military headquarters.

Watch Committee and USIB, with DIA participation, concluded that Soviet activities in Cuba continued to suggest planning for the establishment of permanent Soviet military bases.

At two meetings (0900-1005, 1400-1520), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. With regard to reconnaissance flights, to reinstate the 50 per cent cloud cover rule.
2. That JCS paper for presentation to the President on 16 November should include comments on a UN working paper regarding the establishment of a UN Observation Group in Central America and the Caribbean area. The JCS opposed the proposal on grounds that it provided inspection less effective than US interests required, endangered the right to continue US air surveillance, and included reciprocal features that might raise questions regarding US integrity or prove otherwise unacceptable.

3. That the draft memorandum for the President (see item for 14 November), "Military Aspects of

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the Cuban Situation,' should be discussed. Further consideration of the memorandum, the discussion with the President on 16 November would be informal, each Chief presenting his own views on particular topics, using as a framework for the discussion a talking paper which the Chairman undertook to revise.

4. To approve CINCLANT's request to conduct a joint AFLANT/ARLANT rehearsal of certain phases of OPLAN 316, beginning 19 November, subject to the following conditions: for each exercise, the degradation effect on OPLANs 312 and 316 to be determined and the JCS advised; the commitment of MATS C-124 aircraft for the exercises to be reconsidered if requirements developed elsewhere. The provision of MATS airlift was to be arranged by CSAF. TS

Implementation - A message to the above effect, with the first condition changed at the Chairman's direction to read "Each exercise will be evaluated to insure there is no degradation of readiness to conduct CINCLANT OPLANs 312-61 and 316-62," was dispatched to CSAF and CINCLANT on 16 November. S

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16 November

DIA reported that the following information had been derived from high- and low-level photography on 15 November:

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1. There was no change in the IL-28 situation; assembly was continuing at San Julian.

2. At the Mayari-Arriba military installation, shipping crates and equipment had been identified which appeared to be associated with the coastal-defense cruise missiles. The installation was possibly a support base for these missiles.

On 16 November the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that photos of 14 November showed no evidence of uncrating of the IL-28 crates at Holguin. At San Julian on 13 November camouflage netting had been placed over most of the IL-28s and several of the crates, but apparently no additional fuselages, had been uncrated. Seven aircraft had been assembled or were in the final stages of assembly.

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At a meeting from 0900 to 1026, the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To send to commanders concerned with reconnaissance the text of Castro letter to U Thant vowing to fire on US reconnaissance aircraft. TS

2. After being informed of higher-level decision to cancel low-level flights for 16 November in view of Castro threat, to recommend low-level reconnaissance flights for 17 November, the number and routes to be based on CINCLANT's recommendation, after CINCLANT was advised to expect hostile reaction, to omit the most hotly defended targets, and to ready GREY WOLF mission. TS

3. To advise the President that the Armed Forces were at optimum posture to execute OPLANs 312 TS

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and 316, that the study requested by the President had resulted in earmarking additional forces as ready reserve for OPLAN 316, with additional shipping requirements and cost, that the current status of alert could be maintained for about 30 more days without adverse effect on capabilities, that thereafter a reaction capability of twelve hours for OPLAN 312 and seven days for OPLAN 316 could be maintained if in DEFCON 3, or of two days and ten to twelve days respectively if in DEFCON 5, and further that they recommended maintaining the present posture for the immediate future.

Implementation - Based on J-5 paper "Military TS
Aspects of the Cuban Situation," the JCS dispatched a memorandum to the President on 16 November to the above effect, under the title "Status of Readiness for the Cuban Operation." A copy also was sent to the SecDef.

4. For purposes of the discussion with the TS
President later on 16 November, to recommend that IL-28's be removed from Cuba, preferably by negotiation, otherwise by blockade and, if need be, by military action, that the US make withdrawal of Soviet personnel an immediate negotiating objective, that any assurance given Castro be made dependent on his good behavior and acceptance of air reconnaissance and not contravene US obligations under

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the Rio Pact, and that the US seek the essential goal of long-term verification and inspection by means other than the current proposals for reciprocal UN inspection in the Caribbean and for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

Implementation - Copy of "Chairman's Talking Paper for Meeting with the President" sent to SecDef as enclosure to a CM. TS

5. To recommend to SecDef that existing force levels of OPLAN 316 be accepted as probably adequate, but that the 5th Infantry Division and a Combat Command of 2d Armored Division be earmarked as ready reserve, without movement until directed, and that National Guard divisions not be called up to reconstitute strategic reserve until needed, but that two NG divisions for occupation duty be alerted on S-day of OPLAN 312. Further, to advise the SecDef that they considered the existing Guantanamo Defense Force, with carrier aviation and naval gun fire support, adequate for defense of the present perimeter, but that there was an immediate requirement for activation of 11 LST's, a cost estimate of which was included. TS

Implementation - A memorandum to the above effect was dispatched to the SecDef on 20 November. TS

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17 November

DIA reported the following information derived from high-altitude photography of 16 November:

1. A new SA-2 site had been identified under construction near Maldonado.
2. An old SA-2 site about 10-nm from the above site had been abandoned.
3. The total SA-2 sites now identified are 27, of which three were apparently alternate, unoccupied sites.

Daily Intelligence Summary reported that 15 November photography of San Julian showed thirteen uncrated IL-28s or UIL-28s. None had been uncrated since 12 November. Eleven were assembled, or nearly so, but determination of assembly status was hindered by camouflage.

At a meeting from 1000 to 1219, the JCS agreed or decided:

1. That they did not concur in two memoranda drafted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for the NSC Executive Committee, entitled "Verification, Safeguards and Assurances," and "Relationship of Cuban Objectives to Present Decisions."

2. To approve CINCLANT proposals for improving BLUE MOON operations in the matter of tactical and targeting procedures designed to avoid set patterns and reduce aircraft time in target area, change of code name and substitution of messages for telephone use, but to require specific daily requests for authorization to escort reconnaissance aircraft, employ faker flights (feints), or utilize night photo planes.

3. To approve for planning purposes proposals concerning GREY WOLF operations (CINCAFLANT's

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response if a low-level reconnaissance aircraft failed to return), but to prohibit implementation without prior JCS approval.

4. That CINCONAD's proposals for the force posture that could be indefinitely maintained should be approved, i.e., CINCONAD was to be authorized to maintain the current deployment in southeastern US, but elsewhere to recall fighter-interceptor aircraft to their home bases, to maintain operating capability at dispersal bases, and to restore individual proficiency training and resume unit training under direct CINCONAD control. TS

5. To provide CINCONAD, CINCLANT and CINCSAC with the text of the JCS memorandum on "Status of Readiness for the Cuban Operation," which had been discussed with the President on 16 November, and to instruct the three commanders to maintain the current readiness posture described therein. TS

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10 November

On 18 November the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that:

1. Photography of 16 November showed a new SA-2 site under construction in eastern Cuba and the apparent abandonment of another.

2. On 15 November canvas and net-covered equipment was dispersed throughout the Mayari-Arriba military area near Banes. There were 45 large shipping crates similar to those seen at the Banes cruise-missile site. Refugees have reported an undetermined number of flat-bed trailers with large crated cargo moving toward the above area on 20 October.

On 19 November DIA reported that photography of 17 and 18 November did not reveal any significant changes in the Cuban situation.

On 19 November Director, DIA, in a memorandum to Chairman, JCS, conveyed the conclusion that the only means available to Cuban armed forces to prevent US overflights were AAA, AWs, and possibly jet fighters. None had capability to interfere with U-2, little against low-level flights.

At two meetings (0900-1052, 1445-1740), the JCS agreed and decided:

1. In view of the higher-level decision against low-level reconnaissance flights on 19-20 November, to recommend only U-2 reconnaissance for 20 November.

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2. To reaffirm their views on "Recommended US Reaction to Hostile Attack of US Reconnaissance Aircraft over Cuba," which they had forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 7 November.

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3. That a paper drafted by Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), entitled "Some Tentative Lessons from Cuba" and intended for possible distribution to the Military Sub-Group of the Washington Quadripartite

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Ambassadorial Group, should not be distributed as proposed and should be subject to interagency review before any such use, since the incomplete achievement of US objectives rendered an assessment of the "lessons" as yet speculative.

Implementation - A memorandum to the above effect was dispatched to the Secretary of Defense on 20 November.

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20 November

At two meetings (0900-1033, 1400-1514), the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To recommend for 21 November a larger TS
number of reconnaissance flights than usual involving
16 targets and 16 aircraft.

2. Upon Rules of Engagement and arrangements TS
for fighter support for BLUE MOON flights, as follows:
a CAP of 8-16 aircraft for each reconnaissance flight
to be stationed off the Cuban coast beyond SAM range,
on call to assist photographic aircraft and authorized
to engage aircraft considered hostile; fighter sweep of
8-16 planes to retrace route of any BLUE MOON aircraft
fired upon, as soon as practicable and on specific JCS
directive, and to attack antiaircraft batteries that
had fired on previous BLUE MOON aircraft; thereafter
flak-suppression flights of about 8 fighter aircraft
to be assigned to all BLUE MOON routes and to be dis-
patched, immediately in advance of photo aircraft,
under order to fire on antiaircraft positions that fire
upon BLUE MOON aircraft. Clean draft of paper to be
prepared, approved for dispatch to CJCS at White House
but not for dispatch to CINCLANT.

Implementation - Memorandum embodying the TS
above was sent to SecDef the same date, except

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for substitution of "ground elements" for "anti aircraft batteries" and "anti aircraft positions."

3. To confirm concurrence in rules of engagement promulgated by CINCLANT in situations requiring measures of self-protection in peacetime. TS

Implementation - A message to the above effect had been dispatched to CINCLANT on 20 November as an interim reply, which was confirmed by a message on 21 November. TS

4. To defer decision on relaxing MINIMIZE until 21 November TS

5. "As a basic guidance for use as applicable," TS that the concept of a nuclear-free Latin America under UN supervision, presented in a State Department draft paper "Phase III - Long Term Arrangements - Cuba," would not serve the best interests of the US and that the proposed course of action for realizing the concept would not, under the assumed conditions, contribute to the attainment of US objectives.

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21 November

DIA reported the following information derived from high-altitude photography of 20 November.

1. There was no photographic evidence to substantiate a report of a Soviet submarine base being located at Cayo Largo.

2. There was no photographic evidence to substantiate a report of unusual military activity in Las Villas Province.

3. The nine shipping crates at Holguin airfield remained unopened.

The Daily Intelligence Summary reported that further study of photographs of the Holguin military camp had resulted in identification of some 350 Soviet military vehicles, including 31 T-54 tanks, 4-5 PT-76 amphibious tanks, nine SU-100 assault guns, and 56 squad and 44 pyramidal tents. At least 1000 Soviet troops were probably located there.

At two meetings (0900-1030, 1400-1551) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. That, in view of the President's announcement of 20 November lifting the quarantine, they should submit recommendations as soon as possible on relaxing the readiness posture and returning forces to their normal stations, and in this connection, to ask CINCLANT, CINCONAD and CINCSAC for recommendations as follows:

TS

a. CINCLANT (and CINCSAC as involved): - on the DEFCON and return of units, assuming relaxed reaction times as follows:

(1) U-2 flights - an average of no more than two per day in any 10-day period and no more than 5 in one day.

(2) Low-level reconnaissance - four aircraft on 12-hour alert, eight on 24-hour

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alert, similar readiness for all supporting aircraft.

(3) Local reprisal strike aircraft - same readiness as BRASS KNOB and BLUE MOON missions plus two hours.

(4) Attack on SAM sites, IL-28's, and/or all Cuban defenses - 48 hours.



b. CINCONAD:- on the permanent augmentation of air defenses in southeastern US following termination of Cuban incident, and on the phasedown of the current reinforcements of the area, assuming normal status by 20 December.

c. CINCSAC:- on the level of readiness for SAC during the next 30 days, excluding U-2's.

d. All three commanders:- on intelligence objectives requiring aerial reconnaissance during the next 30 days.

2. In response to CINCLANT's recommendation of 16 November for immediate reinforcement of Guantanamo, that such reinforcement was unnecessary at this time in view of the recent announcement on the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba, and that CINCLANT should plan for reinforcement, in the event it became necessary

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later, with forces other than the 5th MEB, which would best be used in amphibious operations in Western Cuba.

Implementation - Joint Staff was instructed to prepare a reply to the above effect, and on 24 November a message conforming to the above was dispatched to CINCLANT.

TS

3. That a draft message to Stevenson and McCloy, "Next Steps in New York Negotiations," should be amended to make the language more specific, particularly to insure that the right of overflight surveillance was not affected by noninvasion assurances, and to avoid the implication that the US was interested in the departure of only those Soviet personnel chagrined with defending weapons systems.

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4. That a report by SACSA on "Cuba Planning" had been overtaken by events.

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23 November

On 22 November the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that recent reports by refugees of a submarine base on Cayo Largo Island were not confirmed by photographs of 20 November but that some dredging in the port area had taken place. The nine IL-28s at Holguin were still uncrated. S

On 23 November the Daily Intelligence Summary contained a detailed Supplement on Soviet military forces in Cuba and stated that these were now believed to number about 16,000. S

At a meeting (1400-1700) the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To recommend to SecDef approval of a DIA memo, "Reconnaissance Program in Cuba (C)." TS

Implementation - For reaffirmation of decision and eventual recommendation to SecDef, see 28 November, item 1.

2. That another DIA memo, "Reconnaissance Coverage for Critical Areas in Cuba," addressed to the Chairman, JCS, should be revised to include detailed justification of the low-level reconnaissance recommended therein for 24 November. TS

3. In addition to advising CINCLANT reinforcement of Guantanamo and use of 5th MEB (see 21 Nov., item 2), to advise CINCLANT further that reinforcement of the Guantanamo defense force might be required under OPLAN 316, and to request CINCLANT. TS

a. To modify OPLAN 316 to include changed concept.

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b. To keep Guantanamo defense requirements under continuous review.

Implementation - CINCLANT so advised and instructed on 24 November. However, the JCS on 28 November (see 28 November, item 2) directed a general review and revision of OPLANs 312, 314, and 316 in the light of experience during the crisis. (This review still in progress on 18 December.)

TS

5. To refer a Director's Flimsy, "Readiness Posture Requirements," based on recommendations from CINCLANT, CINCONAD, and CINCSAC, to the OpsDepts for revision and preparation of a memo to SecDef to be dispatched by 24 November without further reference to the JCS.

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Implementation - The OpsDepts were not able to agree on the desired memo; after revision based on further guidance by CJCS on 27 November, a memo to the SecDef was approved by the JCS on 28 November (see 28 November, item 4).

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24 November

On 24 November the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that reconnaissance of 23 November revealed no significant developments in Cuba.

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At a meeting (0830-1018), the JCS (OpsDeps) agreed or decided:

That the Canadians should be informed when it was decided to change CONAD alert status.

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On 26 November 1962, the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that thirteen Soviet IL-28s, three tankers, two passenger ships and a fishing trawler were in Cuban ports or coastal waters.

On 27 November the Daily Intelligence Summary reported that photography of 25 November indicated seven of the thirteen IL-28s at San Juan were being disassembled and that none of the 20 crates showed signs of having been opened. At Holguin the IL-28 crates were apparently still unopened.

At a meeting (1000-1243), the JCS (OpsDepts) agreed or decided:

1. To approve a CINCNORAD proposal that the Laredo and Moorestown sensors be returned to SPADATS, effective 280001Z November. TS

2. To approve a memorandum to SecDef enclosing their review of a memorandum by ASD(ISA) "Some Lessons from Cuba (U)." TS

In their covering memorandum, the JCS said that "generalizations on lessons learned should be undertaken with caution," and requested that they be permitted to review the final version of the paper, after interagency comments had been considered.

Implementation - Review forwarded to SecDef on 3 November.

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November

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1. The Soviets were continuing to disassemble IL-28s at San Julian. Analysis of 25 November photography indicated four complete aircraft as compared to six seen on the previous day.

2. At Holguin only five of the previous nine IL-28 crates had been observed.

3. Construction continued on the runway at Colonel Manlio Garcero Airfield on the Isle of Pines.

4. Additional information from 25 November photographs showed that the launch areas at the San Cristobal Airfield continued to appear abandoned.

5. At the Airfield at Cienfuegos, some of the numerous vehicles remained in the adjacent areas.

6. At the Airfield at Sancti Spiritus continued to see 12 C-119s and 12 C-47s and 12 C-54s and at the Airfield at Pinar del Rio 12 C-47s and 12 C-54s.

7. At San Juan Airfield 12 C-54 aircraft, including 12 C-54s and four MIG-17 mock-ups had been observed.

At a meeting from 1000 to 1307, the JCS agreed or decided:

1. To reaffirm agreement of 23 November, to forward memo by Director, DIA on reconnaissance program in Cuba to SecDef recommending approval; JCS concurred in DIA view that continued high-level reconnaissance was needed, supplemented by low-level coverage of specific targets, and in listing of IL-28 departure and possible reintroduction of offensive weapons as major intelligence targets. These views to be used by CJCS in possible discussions at higher level.

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Implementation - A memorandum setting forth the recommendation was dispatched to the SecDef

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on 20 November.

2. In response to a directive from the President that Cuba plans be reviewed to determine means of compressing reaction times, to direct CINCLANT to review OPLANS 316, 312, and 314 (order of priority) in light of recent experience, to confirm or recommend modifications to the basic concepts and force requirements, and to advise regarding possibilities of reducing reaction times both within plans and between H-Day for 312 and D-Day for 314/316.

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3. To defer reexamination of the requirement for retention of the US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until such time as required by the international situation.

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4. After making amendments, to approve a memorandum to SecDef on readiness posture requirements. In instructions on 27 November, Chairman had stated that higher authority did not attach importance to phasing reduction of readiness posture in relation to progress of negotiations in New York. Accordingly, while alert posture criteria already defined should stand, redeployment of forces in consonance therewith to be scheduled on basis of administrative efficiency only; assuming IL-28 withdrawal proceeds as promised, forces should be returned to normal pre-Cuba status by Christmas.

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Memorandum to SecDef requested approval of program set forth, designed for new phase of Cuban situation introduced by Presidential announcement on 20 November lifting quarantine. Period since that date already marked by such relaxation actions as termination of SAC 1/8' airborne alert and release of Air Force Reserve Troop Carrier units, but other forces being maintained at high readiness, capable of reacting on 12-hour basis for CINCLANT OPLAN 312 and 7-day basis for OPLAN 316, subject to accumulation of shipping. In context of new situation, recognizing both need for high and low-level reconnaissance to check fulfillment of Soviet commitments and maintenance needs and personnel hardships imposed by high alert levels, JCS considered following alert posture criteria appropriate at present time:

a. Overflight reconnaissance:

(1) High-Level: Alert posture which will permit an average of two U-2 flights per day in any 10-day period and not more than a maximum of five U-2 flights on any one day.

(2) Low-Level: Four aircraft on 12-hour alert and eight aircraft on 24-hour alert, and similar readiness for all aircraft which support the foregoing reconnaissance missions (i.e., Fighter

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except, MAP, SAR, ELINT, etc.).

b. Local reprisal strike aircraft: 24 hours following a decision to execute a reprisal.

c. Reimposition of the quarantine of Cuba: 72 hours.

d. Attack on SAM sites, IL-28s, and/or all air defenses in Cuba: 48 hours.

e. Execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62: 72 hours.

f. Execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-62: 18 days.

g. Air Defense: Resume normal posture except for those units which may be needed to increase the air defense of the southeastern United States on a permanent basis. Long-term air defense needs for this region are under study.

h. Strategic Forces: Maintenance of normal alert levels.

Relaxation of readiness posture to above levels would permit following actions at this time:

(1) CINCLANT and component headquarters: while maintaining currently activated communications net, CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT headquarters elements return to home stations except for reduced staffs to be maintained at Homestead.

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(2) Air Forces: return all units, less those involved in reconnaissance missions, to home bases and resume normal training.

(3) Marine forces: return all West Coast units, less 3d LAAM Battalion, to home stations; FMF Atlantic units currently part of Guantanamo defense augmentation remain as deployed with goal of return to home stations by 20 December.

(4) Army Forces: return all units to home stations except those involved in (1), above.

(5) Navy Forces: return to normal operations, except one CVA Group retained on station to support defense of Guantanamo until 20 December and one Carrier Task Group in readiness for possible requirement of sighting ships departing Cuba bearing IL-28's or to support possible airstrikes under OPLAN 312.

JCS recommended immediate reduction to above readiness levels and undertake to review situation on continuing basis to determine, in light of progress of IL-28 withdrawal, whether it warrants continued phase-down to approximately normal posture by about 20 December; if so, remaining units could return to home stations and dependents begin return to Guantanamo prior to Christmas.

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JCS noted timely availability of shipyard would continue to be critical factor in achieving 12-day reaction time for OPLAN 316, accordingly recommended that COMUSCIB be given authority to requisition ships and to receive transports when decision made to prepare for execution of OPLAN 316, and that reconditioning of all LSTs be continued, without full manning.

Implementation - Staffer approved received same day, subject to modification of method of determining average daily U-2 flights. Message dispatched to CINCLANT directing implementation of provisions, with JCS to be advised of all unit movements contemplated in CINCLANT's implementation schedule.

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Appendix I

Reconnaissance Sorties over Cuba,
14 October - 10 December 1962

DATE	HIGH ALTITUDE U-2	LOW ALTITUDE RF-101 F8U	
14 Oct	1		
15 Oct	2		
17 Oct	6		
18 Oct	2		
19 Oct	3		
20 Oct	3		
22 Oct	3		
23 Oct	3		6
25 Oct	1		10
26 Oct	1	10	
27 Oct	1		14
29 Oct		6	2
1 Nov		4	2
2 Nov		2	2
3 Nov	1	4	2
4 Nov	5	6	
5 Nov	5	2	6
6 Nov	3	6	2
7 Nov	2	4	4

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DATE

HIGH ALTITUDE
U-2

LOW ALTITUDE
RF-101 F8U

8 Nov	2	3	4
9 Nov		6	4
10 Nov	3	6	4
11 Nov	2	6	4
12 Nov	3	6	4
13 Nov	2	4	6
14 Nov	3		
15 Nov	5	4	2
16 Nov	3		
17 Nov	4		
18 Nov	1		
20 Nov	4		
21 Nov	1		
22 Nov	1		
23 Nov	1		
24 Nov	2		
25 Nov	2		
26 Nov	2		
27 Nov	2		
28 Nov	2		
29 Nov	1		
30 Nov	1		
2 Dec	2		

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DATE

HIGH ALTITUDE
U-2

LOW ALTITUDE
RF-101 F8U


3 Dec	2
4 Dec	2
5 Dec	2
6 Dec	2
7 Dec	1
10 Dec	1

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BRIEF SUMMARY OF SERVICE PARTICIPATION
IN THE CUBAN CRISISArmy

The Army, as its primary mission during the Cuban crisis, prepositioned the troops scheduled to participate in CINCLANT OPLAN 316. These constituted a force



The force was broken down into four parts: 1)



Deployment of certain of these forces to staging bases began on 24 October; by 10 November, the total force was at staging bases. All of the air echelon and about half of each of the other components, however, were directed to stage from home bases, and so did not have to move.

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To provide logistic support for these combat forces in the southeastern US, the Army deployed more than 80 separate service units. They began leaving their home stations on 23 October and had all arrived at designated stations by 7 November.

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In addition to the prepositioning of forces called for by OPLAN 316, the Army deployed the 13th Air Defense Group to Florida bases to reinforce the air defenses of the southeastern US.

S

Group headquarters, one HAWK Battalion (-), one NIKE-HERCULES Battalion (-), and one automatic weapons battery were stationed at Homestead Air Force Base. One HAWK Battalion moved to Key West Naval Air Station. These deployments began on 22 October and had been completed by the 31st.

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By JCS directive of 28 November, all deployed Army forces except certain headquarters elements were directed to return to their home stations.

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
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Navy and Marine Corps

The Navy carried out as its primary mission during the Cuban crisis a naval quarantine of Cuba intended to prevent the shipment to the island of offensive weapons.

Declared effective as of 24 October by President Kennedy, it was enforced by CINCLANT Task Force 136,

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The mission of Task Force 136 was to prevent the seaborne shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba. Offensive weapons were defined to include surface-to-surface missiles, bomber aircraft, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles, warheads for any of the above weapons, and mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items.

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In carrying out its mission, Task Force 136 was to intercept and if necessary to determine whether prohibited cargo was on board, to visit and search all vessels designated by CINCLANT. Ships that refused to stop when ordered to do so would be forcibly halted. If the crews offered organized resistance to boarding parties, the ships would be sunk.

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On 25 October, eight Soviet merchant ships that had been sailing towards Cuba reversed course. The first ship intercepted was the Soviet tanker Bucharest. Her cargo was checked visually and determined to contain no contraband. She was allowed to proceed. The following day the Lebanese-flag, Soviet-chartered, freighter Marucla was intercepted and boarded. She, too, was found to be carrying no contraband and was cleared to proceed. This vessel was the only one boarded by US naval forces while the quarantine was in effect.

The intercept area was expanded on 28 October by the addition of another arc of 500-mile radius and centered on Havana. By this addition, the perimeter of the intercept area was extended to 2500 nautical miles. Two destroyer stations were added. On 30 October, a shorter quarantine line, running from a point just north of Puerto Rico and extending to a

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point off the Florida coast, was put into effect. This line contained only eight stations and could be manned by fewer ships.

The quarantine was suspended from 30 October to 1 November during U Thant's visit to Cuba and at his request. On 20 November, after the Soviets had agreed to remove all IL-28 bombers from Cuba, President Kennedy ordered the quarantine ended. Since the imposition of the quarantine on 24 August, Task Force 136 had intercepted 55 ships. All were cleared to proceed after their cargoes had been determined to contain no contraband.

The Navy, in addition to conducting the quarantine operations, sent all seven operational Polaris submarines to sea fully armed. By 26 October, all the boats were on their assigned stations and on 15-minute alert. TS

The Navy also furnished Carrier Air Group 10 to CINCPACFLT as a component of the attack forces required by OPLAN 312. TS

Another Naval mission, carried out by Navy and Marine F-8Us, was low-level aerial reconnaissance of Cuba. The first sortie was flown on 23 October; by the end of November, 82 sorties had been flown. S

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The Marine Corps, as its major undertaking during the Cuban crisis, deployed the II Marine Expeditionary Force, which was designated as the landing force component under CINCLANT OPLAN 316. The force was divided into three major groups.

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The first group, designated Landing Group West,

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[REDACTED]

All of the units of the Force were deployed afloat between the 26th and 31st of October.

A second force of Marines [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

was assigned to reinforce the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and arrived there on the 22nd and 23rd. These reinforcements brought the total Marine strength at Guantanamo to about [REDACTED]

Landing Group East which was to effect a landing

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[REDACTED]

The force,

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which numbered about [REDACTED] was ordered to embark on 23 October. It received its sailing orders on the 25th, transitted the Panama Canal between the 5th and 7th of November, and proceeded to take up positions in the Caribbean.

In addition to these forces under OPLAN 316, the Marine Corps supplemented the air defenses of Guantanamo with a battery of the 3rd LAAM (HAWK) battalion. The 3rd LAAM deployed from George AFB, California to Cherry Point on the 23rd; by the 28th one battery had been emplaced at Guantanamo.

The 14th Marine Air Group which arrived at Key West, Florida from Cherry Point, North Carolina on the 23rd formed part of CINCPACFLT's air attack force under OPLAN 312.

On 28 November, the JCS directed the return of Marine units to their normal functions. Units of the II MEF afloat were ordered ashore, and all FMFPAC forces except the 3rd LAAM Battalion were ordered back to their parent command. Two BLTs of the 2nd Division, however, were retained at Guantanamo.

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Air Force

The most significant Air Force operation during the Cuban crisis consisted of carrying out reconnaissance flights over Cuba and surrounding waters. It was a U-2 aircraft of the Strategic Air Command that, on 14 October, took the first pictures clearly revealing offensive missile sites in Cuba. This flight was the first U-2 flight carried out by SAC. Similar flights continued almost daily. By the end of October, 26 had been flown; and during November, an additional 67 sorties were carried out.

Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba was carried out by RF-101s of CINCAFLANT. These missions began on 26 October. During October 16, sorties were flown; during November, there were 68 sorties.

Surveillance of Atlantic waters by SAC in support of CINCLANT's quarantine operations began on 25 October employing 21 aircraft. In addition, B-52s in flight on their regular missions reported on shipping when flying over Atlantic waters.

The Air Force, in addition to surveillance operations, prepositioned tactical forces at bases from which they could rapidly execute CINCLANT OPLANS 312

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materiel began on 14 October and had been completed by 20 October. By this date, most of the requirements to support the plans were in place, including a seven-day supply of munitions, fuel tanks and pylons.

Deployment of the OPLAN 312 force to Florida bases began on 20 October and had been completed by the end of the 22nd. There were then [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] On 23 October, this force went on one hour alert. During the period 28-30 October it was on immediate alert, with pilots standing by in ready rooms and external power plants connected to aircraft. On 8 November, CINCPACFLT placed his force on a revised alert status consisting of ready alert status for the aircraft of the first and second waves and release of aircraft of the third wave to local flying and maintenance, subject to recall within four hours.

The Air Force also took steps to bring air defenses of the United States to maximum readiness. Such measures included the dispersal and placing on alert of the CONAD interceptor force and reinforcement of the air defenses in the Florida area. Between 18 and 21 October, 56 additional fighters were moved to Florida bases and, by the 25th dispersal and

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alerting of the entire interceptor force had been completed. On this date, [redacted] aircraft were on 5-minute ground alert, [redacted] were on 15-minute ground alert, and [redacted] were on 1-to-3 hour ground alert. Of this force, [redacted] were in Florida. [redacted] were on 5-minute alert, [redacted] on 15-minute alert, and [redacted] on 1-to-3 hour alert. There were, in addition, [redacted] aircraft on airborne alert around the Florida peninsula.

The Strategic Air Command also took steps to achieve the highest possible state of readiness to execute its mission.

Readiness measures began on 22 October when one eighth of the B-52 bomber force (66 planes) went on airborne alert. Selected elements of the B-47 force began dispersal and completed their movement [redacted] 24 hours later. With the beginning of the naval quarantine of Cuba on 24 October, SAC readiness was stepped up by declaration of DEFCON 2, resulting in the ground alert of [redacted] aircraft in addition to the [redacted] on airborne alert. Between 2 and 5 November, the airborne alert figure was increased to [redacted] as the B-52H modification program made more planes available. Additional measures to improve combat readiness included the deployment on 22 October

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and a further deployment on 29 October of

The B-47
reflex force in the [redacted] was
also increased by [redacted] aircraft.

The Air Force began to stand-down from its alert posture on 20 November, the date when the quarantine of Cuba was ended. On that date, the JCS directed SAC to return to the airborne alert status in effect prior to the Cuban crisis. C

On the 24th, the JCS authorized SAC to terminate the dispersal of the B-47 force. DEFCON 5 was authorized worldwide by the JCS on the 28th, and on the 30th CINCAFLANT and CINCONAD directed all but a few of their aircraft to return to home stations. S

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(air attack) or 316 (invasion) in the event that such